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The eponymous protagonist of Austerlitz, W.G. Sebald's final prose novel, is 
haunted by landscapes of loss. Both Austerlitz and the narrator are acutely aware of 
the signs of destruction and of the invisible histories of loss in the landscapes through 
which they travel. Through the gaze of both these characters Sebald exposes the 
haunted wasteland of post -war Europe and describes the sites of many of the 
atrocities of the Holocaust. While much has been written about Sebald's use of 
landscape and his emphasis on memory, there is very little research to date that has 
taken a phenomenological approach to Sebald's texts. There are specific affinities, for 
example, between the musings of the protagonist and the narrator of Sebald's 
Austerlitz and Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of perception. This dissertation explores 
the implications of Merleau-Ponty's existential phenomenology as an approach to 
Sebald's Austerlitz, by showing that while phenomenology provides a valuable 
conceptual framework through which to engage the novel, there are aspects of this 
phenomenological approach which Sebald's work, in its narrative fonn, is able to 
extend beyond the boundaries of philosophical discourse. The central argument is that 
Austerlitz's perception of architectural sites is inextricably linked to aspects of 
memory and narrative. This dissertation first explores the thematic concerns of the 
outworking of traumatic memory in the spaces of architecture, in the subjective 
experience of time, and in the act of perception; after which it examines how Sebald's 












" ... and Vera said that evelY time we reached the page which described the snow falling through the 
branches of the trees, soon to shroud the entire forest floor, I would look up at her and ask: But if it's 
all white, how do the squirrels know where they've buried their hoard? ... Those were your velY 
words, the question which constantly troubled you. How indeed do the squirrels know, what do we 
know ourselves, how do we remember, and what is it we find in the end? " 
(Sebald 287) 
At the outset of their second conversation, which takes place on the banks of 
the river Schelde in Antwerp, Austerlitz describes to the narrator a scene of a painting 
by Lucas van Valckenborch in which the people of Antwerp are skating on the frozen 
Schelde. Austerlitz is haunted by a tiny scene in the comer of the painting in which a 
woman has fallen on the ice: 
Looking at the river now, thinking of that painting and its tiny figures, 
said Austerlitz, I feel as if the moment depicted by Lucas van 
Valckenborch had never come to an end, as if the canary-yellow lady 
had only just fallen over or swooned, as if the black velvet hood had 
only this moment dropped away from her head, as if the little accident, 
which no doubt goes unnoticed by most of its viewers, were always 
happening over and over again, and nothing and no one could ever 
remedy it. (emphasis mine, Sebald 16) 
Austerlitz's unusual awareness of this misfortune on the margin of the painting 
reveals the sensitivity towards trauma and suffering which shapes his perceptual 
experience. He acknowledges that his gaze activates what, as he says, 'no doubt goes 
unnoticed by most' and yet is, for some reason, of great importance for him - even 











the personal experience of perception and the arresting of the time of a traumatic 
event, encapsulates the preoccupations of this dissertation. 
While much has been written about Sebald's use oflandscape and his 
emphasis on memory, there is very little research to date that has considered the 
importance of a phenomenological approach to Sebald's texts. Those who focus on 
Sebald's concern with memory and narratives of trauma primarily rely on Freudian 
and post-Freudian discourse in their critical engagements}. Other critics who explore 
Sebald's unique use of the visual and the verbal, specifically his use of photographs 
throughout his oeuvre, focus on readings orientated towards visual cultural studies 
and metaphysical representations2 . Martin Swales' work on Sebald, however, does 
note the importance of phenomenology in German novelistic discourse. Long and 
Whitehead refer to Swales' work: "Swales points out that German writers of the 
nineteenth century tended to read the phenomenological world as a cipher through 
which intimations of the metaphysical reveal themselves to the attentive observer" 
("Introduction" 10). While there are elements of this German genre within Sebald's 
work, I would like to argue that Sebald's depictions of the phenomenological world 
are personal and historical rather than metaphysical. 
Furthermore, there is an obvious lack of critical engagement with regard to the 
relationship between architecture and memory in Sebald's prose - specifically in 
Austerlitz. Russell 1.A. Kilbourn has written an interesting paper on the representation 
of memory in the visual spaces of both architecture and cinema in Austerlitz; 
however, his approach relies on Augustinian and other pre-modem readings of 
architectural spaces, as well as poststructuralist and Freudian discourse. Kilbourn 
} For Freudian and post-Freudian analyses of memory and trauma in Sebald's work, see Duttlinger and 
Zi\Cosky. 
2 For discussions on the landscape as representation, see Beck, Bond, and Ward; for visual and cultural 











briefly mentions what he terms Austerlitz's "phenomenology of time," yet his focus is 
not on phenomenology, but on the spatio-visual representation of the technological 
aspects of the novel (photography and more importantly, cinema). 
This dissertation explores the implications of Merleau-Ponty' s existential 
phenomenology as an approach to Sebald's Austerlitz, by showing that while 
phcnomenology provides a valuable conceptual framework through which to engage 
the novel, there are aspects of this phenomenological approach which Sebald's work, 
in its narrative form, is able to extend beyond the boundaries of philosophical 
discourse. The central argument of this dissertation is that Austerlitz's perception of 
architectural sites is inextricably linked to aspects of memory and narrative. 
Therefore, I wish to explore how Austerlitz engages with the ghostly reminders of his 
past which are hidden from him in the landscape. Austerlitz is haunted by a past he 
cannot remember - it is invisible and yet it dominates all of his experiences. He 
spends his life following inexplicable promptings without being able to understand 
them. It is only much later in his life, when he begins to discover concrete traces of 
his forgotten (and now destroyed) past, that his repressed memories are restored and 
he is able to read the significance in the signs he had been following his entire life. 
In my phenomenological approach I rely primarily on the philosophy of 
Merleau-Ponty as it creates a helpful framework through which to speak about 
Austerlitz's troubled experiences of space and time. As an existential 
phenomenologist, Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is premised on the importance of the 
body of the subject as the vehicle through which the act of perception occurs. What I 
would like to propose is that Austerlitz carries in his body the very traumatic 
memories which he has attempted to repress. Therefore it is Merleau-Ponty's 











visible and the invisible in the act of perception which help us to understand the 
haunting that Austerlitz experiences. Because Austerlitz's body carries within it 
memories and significances which are incomprehensible to him, his experiences of 
time and perception have a disconcerting effect upon him. He is bombarded by visible 
signs which are activated by his body and yet their invisible significance, as a result 
of the suppression of his memories, seems inaccessible. This disaggregation between 
the visible and the invisible leaves Austerlitz feeling troubled in all his engagements 
with the landscapes which surround him. He suffers mental and emotional 
breakdowns and yet he cannot avoid these haunting experiences. 
There are certain frameworks which Sebald himself sets up in the novel. 
These are presented to us through the private musings of the narrator and the 
seemingly impersonal, yet poignantly intimate, conversations between Austerlitz and 
the narrator. Austerlitz speaks in depth about the architectural history of sites and the 
nature of time; the narrator explores the relations between darkness and perception. It 
appears that Sebald creates such topics to introduce his readers to the character of 
Austerlitz, as all these subjects shape Austerlitz's experiences oflandscape and 
memory. What we, as readers, discover is that from the start these conversations have 
been shaped by personal narrative. 
This dissertation comprises four chapters: three thematic and one formal. 
The first three consider a phenomenological approach to thematic aspects of the 
novel: the outworking of traumatic memory in the spaces of architecture, in the 
subjective experience of time and in the act of perception. The final chapter acts as a 
coda which reveals the correlation between the thematic and formal characteristics of 
the novel: it examines how Sebald's narrative technique creates a text-scape which 











In the first chapter, I explore how theories of the relationship between 
architecture and memory provide a framework through which to discuss how 
Austerlitz's study of architecture performs the function of remembering: both the past 
lives of others and the way in which these are connected with his own past. I discuss 
how architecture works as both a space for memory, and as a signifier of the 
forgotten. It is therefore through Austerlitz's discussions of architectural history that 
he subconsciously reveals the buried pasts with which his own narrative is entwined. 
Through Austerlitz's discussions of the nature of time, we begin to understand 
that his experience of memory is deeply affected by a split sense of traumatic time. In 
the second chapter I discuss how Austerlitz's phenomenology of time resonates with 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. Merleau-Ponty explores the ways in which the 
subjective experience of time is affected by trauma. He argues that traumatic events 
result in the subject experiencing a double-time in which the past becomes imposed 
on each new present. This is Austerlitz's experience of time, although the past which 
he continually experiences is hidden from him. 
In the third chapter I move from a discussion on time to explore the themes of 
the gaze and visual perception. Here Merleau-Ponty's explanation of the relationship 
between the visible and the invisible in any act of perception is instrumental in my 
investigation of Austerlitz's disturbing experiences of perception. As a result of the 
trauma of his past, Austerlitz is doubly haunted by both the repressed memory of his 
childhood and the dead past of the life which he should have lived in Prague. He is 
acutely aware that there is an invisible world surrounding him which he experiences 
the effects of and yet is unable to uncover. He often describes this as feeling that a 
shadow is following him, or something invisible is brushing him. Austerlitz's gaze 











sees points silently towards his destroyed and buried past, and the irony of the 
situation is that Austerlitz is unable to see the significance in his landscapes. 
Austerlitz looks to history to learn about the invisible past of each site to which he 
feels drawn. He becomes an expert in reading the landscape, and yet he is unable to 
understand the personal significance in his perceptions. Therefore all his readings 
leave Austerlitz feeling that something is still hidden from his gaze. It is only when 
the 'self-censorship' of his mind begins to lift and he discovers the traces of his 
forgotten past and impossible future, that he is finally able to read his personal 
meaning in the landscape. 
It is through this journey of repression and discovery that Austerlitz and those 
who read his narrative begin to understand the importance of engaging with and 
reading landscapes. In my concluding chapter I look at the ways in which Sebald's 
narrative technique creates a reading of a text which is rich with landscape and 
objects through which we, as readers, may engage with our own invisible 
significances. Sebald chooses to give his reader the fragments: objects, landscapes, 
histories, animals, photographs and diagrams, rather than an explanatory story or 
linear narrative. Sebald's narrative technique is similar to his story of Austerlitz: we 
are presented with the fragments and coerced into viewing them through our own 
significances and memories. I would like to argue that the novel itself is a landscape 
of fragments waiting to be perceived and lived through the bodies of its readers. As 
Martin Swales puts it: "[Sebald] gives us the circumstances: the sayable things that 
surround the centre of pain, the material traces of the psychological condition of 
blight, deprivation and hurt ... He gives us the rings caused by destruction and 











Sebald's text -scape of fragments avoids a single interpretation. This brings me 
to the epigraph, where Austerlitz, prior to the traumatic separation from his parents, is 
haunted by questions of epistemology and memory. As a young boy, Austerlitz is 
troubled by the way in which, at the onset of winter, the falling snow covers all 
topographical markers, leaving a blank landscape in which the squirrels, which he 
loves to watch, must somehow find their hidden stores of food. When the adult 
Austerlitz is reunited with his childhood nanny, Vera Rysanova, she reminds him of 
his fascination with the squirrels and the picture book of the changing seasons which 
he repeatedly asked for: 
Vera said that every time we reached the page which described the 
snow falling through the branches of the trees, soon to shroud the 
entire forest floor, I would look up at her and ask: But if it's all white, 
how do the squirrels know where they've buried their hoard? ... 
Those were your very words, the question which constantly troubled 
you. How indeed do the squirrels know, what do we know ourselves, 
how do we remember, and what is it we find in the end? (Sebald 287) 
This preoccupation with how we know and remember haunts Austerlitz's entire life: 
first through his studies of architectural history, and later in his quest to uncover both 
his own forgotten past and those of his parents. However, just as Austerlitz is never 
able ultimately to know the story of his life in a linear and concrete progression, so 
those who read Sebald's work are continually prompted to re-work their own 












Architecture and Memor~ 
"Austerlit:: spoke at length about the marks of pain which, as he said he well knew, trace countlessfine 
lines through histOly. In his studies of railway architecture . .. he could never quite shake off thoughts 
of the agony of leave-taking and the fear offoreign places, although such ideas were not part of 
architectural history proper. Yet, he said, it is often out mightiest projects that most obviously betray 
the degree of our insecurity. " 
(Sebald 16-17) 
On first meeting Jacques Austerlitz, the narrator is impressed by the way in 
which Austerlitz's study of architectural history is intertwined with that of memory: 
"From the first I was astonished by the way Austerlitz put his ideas together as he 
talked ... and the way in which, in his mind, the passing on of his knowledge seemed 
to become a gradual approach to a kind of historical metaphysic, bringing 
remembered events back to life" (Sebald 14). Austerlitz's life is dedicated to the 
study of the architectural history of the capitalist era. However, in his study of 
architecture, Austerlitz focuses on revealing the layers of history and human emotion 
that accumulate on a site over time. What we find, through the course of Austerlitz's 
and the narrator's seemingly impersonal conversations, is that Austerlitz's obsession 
with the spaces of architecture is ultimately an obsession with memory, specifically 
his own memories. While Austerlitz's studies manifest his desire to remember, for the 
majority of his life, his urge to remember is directed into remembering histories 
which seem disconnected from his own. 
What I wish to discuss in this chapter is the link between architecture and 
memory and the way in which Austerlitz's study of architectural history is driven by 











a mnemonic space, a compensatory memory, and as a means through which he is able 
to speak about loss - initially the loss of others, which, in tum, is revealed to be the 
story of his own past. I rely on the works of Sebastien Marot and Frances Yates to 
inform my theoretical approach to architecture and memory; and, in dialogue with 
Russell 1.A. Kilbourn's paper on architecture in Austerlitz, I discuss the ways in 
which architecture acts as both a signifier of Austerlitz's personal memories and a 
space in which his suppressed memories eventually surface. 
A Mnemonic Space 
In his book, Sub-urbanism and the Art of Memory, Sebastien Marot argues 
that the practice of memory has long been linked with the concept of architecture. 
Marot refers to the work of memory theorist Frances Yates who traces the practice of 
memory back to its Grecian origins. Greek orators used imagined architectural 
structures to aid them in remembering their speeches. Yates writes: "Few people 
know that the Greeks, who invented many arts, invented an art of memory ... this art 
seeks to memorize through the technique of impressing 'places' and 'images' on 
memory" (Yates, "Art" xi). Taking this historical approach to memory as his cue, 
Marot seeks to show how place and memory are, more often than not, intertwined; 
and, from this premise, he continues to explain how architecture, as a way of 
investing meaning into a place, works as a site for the practice of memory. 
Marot proposes that this connection between architecture and memory can be 
extended to show that architecture's significance is primarily invisible: it acts as a 
catalyst for memory3. He refers to a lecture given by Yates: "Yates herself addressed 
3 In his discussions of the act of perception, MerIeau-Ponty differentiates between the visible and the 
invisible, arguing that the invisible is the underlying meaning/significance with which the perceiver 
resonates in the visible. While I discuss this aspect of MerIeau-Ponty's philosophy in more depth in 











the possible relevance of her research to contemporary architects: 'So I leave you 
with the thought that buildings may be less solid than they seem existing invisibly in 
the mind of the architect before they are born; remembered invisibly down the ages in 
the memories of the generations ,4" (Marot 11). Thus, according to Yates, the 
importance of architecture extends beyond its structural components to the minds of 
those who conceive, perceive and remember it. In this way architecture forms a kind 
of language which is first in the mind of the person and then in the building as a 
signifier which is read by others who, in tum, carry the image of its 'name' in their 
minds5. 
As architecture works as a space for memory, Kilbourn argues that it is as 
Austerlitz "moves through the uncanny spaces of memory" (153), that his own 
suppressed memories inevitably surface. Like Marot, Kilbourn uses the work of Yates 
to trace the link between architecture and memory, focusing particularly on the way in 
which Greek orators imagined architectural spaces to aid them in remembering their 
speeches (144). Kilbourn therefore argues that: 
Austerlitz's experience is predicated on the transformation of concrete 
built space, through narrative description, into the exteriorised space in 
which memory operates. This transformation temporarily effaces the 
gap between Austerlitz's past and present, as he is suddenly granted 
would argue that it is because the visible components of architectural structures have the capacity to 
carry invisible significance, that they therefore work as a space in which memories are triggered. 
4 This quote from Yates appears in a footnote in Marot's work. The reference is taken from Yates, 
Frances. "Architecture and the Art of Memory." AA Quarterly. 12.4. (1980) 
5 In her paper, "The Remains of the Name," Carrol Clarkson proposes that "to name a landscape is to 
mark sites of human significance on indifferent ground" (17). Clarkson argues that the landscape is 
'indifferent' and therefore any names it is given are a result of the significance that the namer invests in 
it. Clarkson's argument opens a conversation about naming which is useful to this paper. Ifnaming a 
site is investing human presence into that site, then I would like to propose that architecture performs a 
similar function as a signifier: architecture is a way of naming, or marking human significance upon 
the landscape. Where Clarkson proposes that names carry traces of human history and significance, I 
would like to offer that architecture acts in a similar way. Architecture often attests to the human 











entry to a space whose historical existence he had long since ceased to 
be aware ... for Austerlitz ... architecture becomes the literal 
mnemonic space, the operation of which is recounted in a narrative 
whose meaning cannot be divorced from its textual status. (144) 
Architecture, therefore, with its undeniable connection to that of memory, aids 
Austerlitz in his quest to rcmembcr. For most of his life, Austerlitz cannot explain his 
fascination with architecture; it is only occasionally, in moments of clarity, that he is 
able to see that his studies hold significant personal meaning. 
The mysterious importance of the architecture which Austerlitz studies is 
hinted at through his belief that large buildings suggest their own ruin. Although 
Austerlitz has avoided all knowledge of the history of the twentieth century, and that 
of Germany in particular, the very buildings that he studies point towards destruction: 
both their own ruination and the destruction of the society that built them. Austerlitz 
explains the sense of dread which he feels before such large buildings: "At the most 
we gaze at [them] in wonder, a kind of wonder which in itselfis a form of dawning 
horror, for somehow we know by instinct that outsize buildings cast the shadow of 
their own destruction before them, and are designed from the first with an eye to their 
later existence as ruins" (Sebald 23-24). Kilbourn writes that "such imposing 
architectural edifices serve the ironic function of abetting rather than dispelling 
Austerlitz's repression of this specific aspect of Europe's recent past" (147). 
Therefore, although Austerlitz subconsciously restricts his historical studies to the 
nineteenth century, in his encounters with these seemingly terrifying buildings, he is 
faced with their narratives of the historical devastation he seeks to avoid; however, he 
is only able to see this in retrospect: "in fact the whole history of the architecture and 











of the catastrophic events already casting their shadows before them at the time" 
(Sebald 197). The tangible space of these outsized structures creates a mnemonic 
space in which Austerlitz, against his control, begins to read, and therefore remember, 
the very history he subconsciously avoids. 
A Compensatory Memory 
Marot argues that architecture serves as a supporting kind of memory: "the 
memory of places ... serves as a framework and a support medium. It is a memory 
that 'helps another memory'" (12). Marot observes that the past of a site or place is 
determined by the past that it has in the minds of those who remember it. He writes: 
The idea that there may exist, between the past of the city and the past 
of the mind, not only a relationship of formal analogy but almost a 
form of consubstantiality. This holds particularly as one enlarges the 
concept of the city to the entire set of its representations (toponymic, 
oral, written, painted, filmic), through which a good deal of its past 
lives on, continuing to affect our perception of urban reality. (28) 
Thus, it seems that the image of a building or site which is invisible, but present in the 
mind of those remembering it, is more significant than the architecture itself; it is 
what the architecture names or signifies that is important. 
Austerlitz's study of architectural history becomes what he later explains as a 
"substitute or compensatory memory" (Sebald 198). Although he finds himself driven 
to the exploration of architectural history by a force which he feels compelled to 
obey, Austerlitz is unable to justify these urges. However, the fact that his studies 











life-long project, betrays the all-consuming way in which the study of architecture has 
infiltrated his life: 
His investigations ... had long outstripped their original purpose as a 
project for a dissertation, proliferating in his hands into endless 
preliminary sketches for a study, based entirely on his own views, of 
the family likeness between all these buildings. Why he had embarked 
on such a wide field, said Austerlitz, he did not know ... But then 
again, it was also true that he was still obeying an impulse which he 
himself, to this day, did not really understand, but which was somehow 
linked to his early fascination with the idea of a network such as that of 
the entire railway system. (44-45) 
Austerlitz's only explanation for his attraction to the study of architecture is therefore 
based on his belief that architecture points towards something greater than itself: a 
complex system in which everything forms part of an overall design. 
This notion of a greater network is connected with the currents of human 
emotion, and especially the traces of suffering, that Austerlitz uncovers in his study of 
architectural history. He instinctively understands that all his inexplicable promptings 
and desires, the buildings he studies and the ruins they become, are somehow part of 
the study of architecture - a study which, as we saw, he feels has grown beyond his 
control. This brings me to the epigraph, where Austerlitz explains that his study of 
architectural history - his involvement in this network - itself is like an outsized 
building, which carries a sense of impending disaster: 
Austerlitz spoke at length about the marks of pain which, as he said he 
well knew, trace countless fine lines through history. In his studies of 











agony of leave-taking and the fear of foreign places, although such 
ideas were not part of architectural history proper. Yet, he said, it is 
often our mightiest projects that most obviously betray the degree of 
our insecurity. (16-17) 
As a compensatory memory, Austerlitz's study of architectural history is similar to 
that of an outsized building, which ironically reveals its insecurity in its very 
magnitude. 
There are two other passages where Austerlitz alludes to this greater design of 
a network: both of which are based on natural patterning. He describes the plans of 
Liverpool Street and Broad Street stations as resembling the somatic system6 of 
"muscles and sinews in an anatomical atlas" (186); and, later in the novel, when he 
returns to the Seminar Garden in Prague, Austerlitz perceives a correlation between 
the invisible pain which he senses in the city and the natural organization of the roots 
of a tree. His description echoes the epigraph: 
I sat on a bench ... looking out over the buildings of the Lesser 
Quarter and the River Vltava at the panorama of the city, which 
seemed to be veined with the curving cracks and rifts of past time, like 
the varnish on a painting. A little later, said Austerlitz, I discovered 
another such pattern created by no discernable law in the entwined 
roots of a chestnut tree clinging to a steep slope through which Vera 
had told me, said Austerlitz, I liked to climb as a child. (230-231) 
The layers of history which he uncovers in each site, and the eventual ruination of the 
buildings he studies, speak of his invisible resonance with all that is melancholy and 
6 This reminds me of Merleau-Ponty's concept of the flesh, which, he explains, acts as the vehicle 
through which the body and the world perceive and understand each other. The flesh is, for Merleau-











ultimately point towards the greatest pain of the history of the Holocaust - a history 
which he refuses to acknowledge, and yet which is undeniably his own. 
What we come to understand, through the course of the novel, is that 
Austerlitz's study of architectural history acts as compensatory memory which 
temporarily fulfils his desire to remember. Rather than remembering his own past-
which, as I will later discuss, seems to be a complex problem of his wilful 
disremembering and the inability to remember - Austerlitz devotes his life to 
remembering the past lives of others. However, this study of the lives of others is 
carefully constrained to a certain time period, and avoids all acknowledgement of 
both the history and landscape of Germany. When Austerlitz explores the past 
significance of a site or an architectural structure, he subconsciously restricts his 
investigations to pre-twentieth century history. It is as ifhe, unbeknownst to himself, 
has created strategic gaps in his knowledge: both of the history of the Holocaust and 
the geography of Germany, which he later describes as "blank spaces in my otherwise 
well-developed sense of topography" (278). Austerlitz's mind is therefore enacting, 
unbeknownst to himself, a process of disremembering, or, put another way by 1.M. 
Coetzee7: "Landscape hides its historical past from the eye; similarly, the mind 
protects its equanimity by forgetting or repressing what it does not wish to remember" 
(emphasis mine 84). Thus, through his study of architecture, Austerlitz 
subconsciously seeks to fulfil his desires to remember, by remembering the histories 
of others and repressing his own. He is aware that there is an invisible significance in 
7 These words ofCoetzee's refer to the work of South African artist William Kentridge. Kentridge's 
work offers an interesting artistic representation of the relationship between landscape and memory 
through his focus of revealing the layering of history and significance in sites. Staci Boris comments 
that for Kentridge, the landscape takes on the "role as a reservoir of memory and history-personal, 
political and collective"(31). Kentridge's work renders time visible through naming the layers of the 
past in the space of the work of art: the art names the invisible layers through revealing them 
simultaneously. There are interesting connections between Kentridge's work and the work of 
architecture Georges Descombes (whom I discuss in this chapter). Both artist and architect seek to 
reveal layers of time in a single space, a practice which reflects Austerlitz's experience of time, as I 











architecture and that, through studying history, he is able to reveal this implicit 
meaning, and yet the history of his own loss (his separation from his parents and their 
subsequent deaths) remains hidden. 
Architecture Speaks of Loss 
Marot looks to the work of architect Georges Descombes to illustrate the 
signifying aspect of architecture. Descombes' work focuses on the loss of the 
landscape and seeks to speak of that loss through structural design. Descombes' 
architectural projects, therefore, are a way of architecturally 'naming' what has been 
lost. Marot explains: 
Descombes' landscape evokes the sense of loss and disappearance 
most powerfully through a topographic sensibility. The surface of the 
land, inscribed with the history of its alteration, becomes the map and 
the historical record of this place ... Descombes describes it as 
'sedimentary accumulation of traces.' The aesthetic of revealing -
'revealing imperceptible forces', as Descombes put it, sustains a 
tension between what is and what was, between what is present and 
what has been lost. (Marot 74). 
Thus, architecture acts to name what is invisible: to reveal what has been lost or what 
is hidden. 
Descombes uses architecture to speak about (or name) the past of the site 
while altering that site with its present naming. This is because his architectural 
projects are designed to replace what was once present while still naming what has 
been lost. Marot proposes that Descombes' projects do so through their emphasis on 











in locating beneath this single, univocal layer of the present other planes - other 
levels of memory and culture that, by stimulating the visitor to conceive and link 
different, ambivalent readings of that place, restore it to a certain depth and breadth" 
(Marot 85). Descombes designs the park to cause its visitors to conceive of the 
different levels of the history of the site and link them in their minds - therefore 
revealing the layers of time in one site through one architectural project. 
In a way similar to Descombes' architectural work, Austerlitz, through his 
study of architectural history, seeks to reveal the layers of historical significance 
which have been lost in a site or buried beneath a building. The narrator describes this 
as Austerlitz's historical metaphysic: "bringing remembered events back to life" 
(Sebald 14). Austerlitz's study of architecture is therefore not so much about the 
structures of buildings per se, but about their historical significance and the memories 
that form a part of that significance. 
In his descriptions of the structural designs and sites of Liverpool Street and 
Broad Street stations, Austerlitz speaks of the layers of history which have inscribed 
an accumulation of invisible memory on the site. He tells the narrator about the 
different inhabitants and buildings which had been on the site of the station over the 
years: the marshes, which were replaced by the park, and later by the priory of St 
Mary of Bethlehem and Bedlam, the asylum; the slum area which was built on the 
graveyards and bleachfields and the forced removal of the slum inhabitants before the 
station was built (182-186). Tn describing these sites, therefore, Austerlitz focuses on 
remembering what has been lost, rather than the present architectural structures: 
The little river Wellbrook, the ditches and ponds, the crakes and snipe 
and herons, the elms and mulberry trees, Paul Pindar's deer park, the 











Street, Sweet Apple Court and Swan Yard had all gone, and gone now 
too are the millions and millions of people who passed through 
Broadgate and Liverpool Street stations day in, day out, for an entire 
century. (186- 188) 
In speaking about the histories of these stations, Austerlitz uncovers the human 
presence which has been an integral part of the site throughout the centuries. This 
human history is more important to Austerlitz than the structures of the stations 
themselves; and therefore, through placing an emphasis on what has been lost in the 
site, Austerlitz brings to life the invisible past of the stations. 
Similarly, once Austerlitz has faced the history of the twentieth century and 
the destruction of the Holocaust, he describes how the grotesque new library in Paris 
has concealed the layers of the past which the present society would rather forget. 
Austerlitz is both disturbed and repulsed by the structure of the library, itself a large 
building like many which he has studied: 
the hideous, outsize building, the monumental dimensions of which 
were evidently inspired by the late President's wish to perpetuate his 
memory whilst, perhaps because it had to serve this purpose, it was so 
conceived that it is, as I realized on my first visit, said Austerlitz, both 
in its outer appearance and inner constitution unwelcoming if not 
inimical to human beings, and runs counter, on principle, one might 
say, to the requirements of any true reader. (386) 
Austerlitz experiences a heightened sense of concealment in the library, whose 
systems, "consist[ing] entirely of obstructions" (393), seem purposed to deter all 
quest for knowledge. It is only once Austerlitz knows what the library'S seemingly 











obstructive system. One of the librarians, Henri Lemoine, takes Austerlitz up to the 
eighteenth floor of one of the library's towers and fi'om this vantage point, describes 
some of the history of the site: 
Sometimes, so Lemoine told me, said Austerlitz, he felt the current of 
time streaming round his temples and brow when he was up here, but 
perhaps, he added, that is only a reflex of the awareness formed in my 
mind over the years of the various layers which have been 
superimposed on each other to form the carapace of the city. Thus, on 
the waste land between the marshalling yard of the Gare d' Austerlitz 
and the Pont Tolbiac where this Babylonian library now rises, there 
stood until the end of the war an extensive warehousing complex to 
which the Germans brought all the loot they had taken from the homes 
of the Jews in Paris ... (400-401) 
Lemoine explains how all the personal belongings of the Jews interned at Drancy 
were categorized and organized by the Germans at the Austerlitz-Tolbiac storage 
depot and the majority of the plunder was sent off to "the ruined cities of the Reich" 
(403). Lemoine feels as if the building of the library upon this site was possibly an 
attempt to cover the memory of the storage depot. Yet, as he tells Austerlitz, his 
memories of the place will always affect his reading of the significance which he 
associates with the obscenely grotesque library: "for the fact is that the whole affair is 
buried in the most literal sense beneath the foundations of our pharaonic President's 
Grande Bibliotheque ... "( 403). 
Interestingly, the site of the library holds layers of both collective and personal 
significance for Austerlitz, the most obvious of which is the name of the warehouses 











an obvious signifier for the way in which the architecture that Austerlitz is drawn to 
reveals a history which is at once personal and collective: it is history of the 
Holocaust which includes his separation from his parents on the kindertransport, and 
their subsequent persecution. Just as the name of the storage depot signifies the 
terrible acts committed against the Jews on a national level, on a personal level it 
signifies the internment and death of Austerlitz's parents and the destruction which 
has become his own past. Even before Austerlitz was aware of this past, he felt 
himself strangely moved on this site where he and Marie, many years before, had 
stumbled across a travelling circus and listened to haunting music played by the 
circus performers. Austerlitz draws the narrator's attention to the correlation between 
these sites: "the new Bibliotheque Nationale bearing the name of the French President 
now stands on what over the years had become the increasingly dilapidated area on 
the left bank of the Seine, where he and Marie de Verneuil had once attended that 
unforgettable circus performance" (385). Therefore, through using his own 
understanding of the history of the site and the information he learns from Lemoine, 
Austerlitz reveals the invisible history of the library and describes the layers of 
emotional and political significance which have formed the ground beneath the 
monstrosity of the library itself. 
"Without speaking of herself, she revealed her inner being" 
The ways in which Austerlitz's study of architecture acts as a both a 
compensatory memory and a space in whieh he is able to remember are evident when 
his suppressed memories surface. Directly after Austerlitz recollects his memory of 
his past in the ruins of Liverpool Street station, he falls into a prolonged sleep in 











heart of a star-shaped fortress, a dungeon entirely cut off from the outside world, and 
I had to try finding my way into the open, passing down long, low passages which led 
me through all the buildings I had ever visited and described" (196). It seems 
Austerlitz's mind responds to the release of a suppressed memory by pointing to all 
the buildings which have acted as both a compensatory and an exteriorized form of 
memory throughout his life. 
Thus, in his studies and discussions of architectural history, Austerlitz reveals 
both his own history, and the larger one of which his story is a part, through the 
language of architecture. His conversations with the narrator, while seemingly 
impersonal, expose his inner being. Austerlitz himself is able to read Marie's personal 
narrative in their initial impersonal conversation, a conversation about the 
architectural history of a paper-mill: 
You are surrounded by a quiet twilight there, said Marie, you see the 
light of day outside through cracks in the slatted blinds, you hear water 
running gently over the weir, and the heavy turning of the mill wheel, 
and you wish for nothing more but eternal peace. Everything Marie 
meant to me from then on, said Austerlitz, was summed up in this tale 
of the paper-mill in which, without speaking a/herself, she revealed 
her inner being to me. (emphasis mine 367) 
Ironically, while Austerlitz is aware of the ways in which, through their 
conversations, other people disclose their inner beings, it is only later that he realizes 
how his own study and discussion of architecture have revealed his inner being. Only 
once he has faced the historical tragedy of the persecution of his nation in the 
Holocaust, can Austerlitz understand that his studies of architecture have always been 











speaking of architecture, he has revealed both his own memories and their place 












Fast Timej Haunted F resent 
"If Newton really thought that time was a river like the Thames, then where is its source and into what 
sea does itfinally flow? EvelY river, as we know, must have banks on both sides, so where, seen in 
those terms, where are the banks of time? What would be this river's qualities, qualities perhaps 
corresponding to those of water, which is fluid, rather hemy, and translucent?" 
(Sebald 142) 
"If time is similar to a river, it flows from the past towards the present and the jilfure. The present is 
the consequence of the past, and the future of the present. But this often repeated metaphor is 
extremely confused. " 
(Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology 411) 
Introduction: Trauma and Time 
Trauma, "in its most general definition," writes Cathy Caruth, "describes an 
overwhelming experience of sudden or catastrophic events in which the response to 
the event occurs in the often delayed, uncontrolled repetitive appearance of 
hallucinations and other intrusive phenomena" (11). Caruth explains how the 
experience of trauma necessarily affects the subject's experience of time. She argues 
that this is a result of the essence of belatedness which occurs in trauma: "Traumatic 
experience, beyond the psychological dimension of suffering it involves, suggests a 
certain paradox: that the most direct seeing of a violent event may occur as an 
absolute inability to know it; that immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of 
belatedness" (91-92). The medical and psychoanalytic definition of trauma as a 
"wound inflicted ... upon the mind" (3), seems to take the connection between time 











"the breach in the mind's experience of time, self and the world" (4).lt is this effect 
of trauma on the subject's experience of time which I wish to discuss in this section. 
In Austerlitz, Sebald discusses his ideas on time through the eponymous 
character of Jacques Austerlitz and the anonymous narrator. Interestingly, it seems 
that Austerlitz's subjective experience of time needs to be understood before he is 
able to recount his narrative to the narrator: the nature of time is discussed between 
them before Austerlitz's story is told. This is because, throughout Austerlitz's 
narrative, the questions that haunt him about the laws governing the past and the 
nature of time and memory are questions that result from his own traumatic 
experience. The underlying ground for these questions is Austerlitz's experience of 
the past as more present than the present. There are hints that this might be the case 
with the narrator as well and we see, throughout the novel, that both Austerlitz and 
the narrator are acutely aware of time. 
For both Merleau-Ponty and Sebald, time does not exist as a fixed or linear 
progression, but rather, time is located in the subject and called into question by 
memory. Both philosopher and novelist argue that those who have undergone a 
certain degree of trauma are more sensitized to time: they experience a double-time, 
or layering of time, in which the past memory of the traumatic experience continues 
to haunt each new present. Each present is experienced as a dual-present: the past as 
continual vivid present, and the present as overshadowed by the vivid and continual 
past-present. In this section I will demonstrate how Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of 
time in The Phenomenology of Perception resonates with Sebald's phenomenology of 
time seen through the character of Austerlitz: time, as a form of significance, is 
located in the subject who invests it in landscapes and objects accordingly. Both 











of time and personal, or subjective, experiences of time; and, interestingly, to 
highlight the subjectivity of time, both explore the haunting of the past that occurs in 
the subject's experiences of trauma and repression. 
Time is Someone 
In his explanation on the nature of time, Merleau-Ponty draws a distinction 
between what he terms 'constituted' time and 'personal' time. Constituted time is our 
objective, or artificial, notion of time. He writes: "Constituted time, the series of 
possible relations in terms of before and after, is not time itself but the ultimate 
recording of time, the result of its passage, which objective thinking always 
presupposes yet never manages to fasten on to" (Phenomenology 415). Our inability 
to lay hold of constituted time occurs because this 'time' is not a personal time: it is 
not based in the subject. Merleau-Ponty reveals the futility of constituted time: "[it] is 
a setting distinct from me and unchanging, in which nothing either elapses or 
happens" (Phenomenology 415). In constituted time there is no subject to whom 
events may happen, and therefore no events ever occur. Constituted time, as a result, 
is a barren form of time as it is an artificial and meaningless construction. 
In contrast to artificial or constituted time, Merleau-Ponty describes personal 
time as inherently subjective: "a dimension of our being" (Phenomenology 415). 
Personal time cannot exist without the subject - or rather, as he puts it, time is the 
subject. For Merleau-Ponty, therefore, the concepts of time and the subject are 
interchangeable: "We must understand time as the subject and the subject as time" 
(emphasis mine Phenomenology 422). He emphasises that there is an undeniably 
intimate relationship between time and the subject (Phenomenology 410). This 











time, it brings into existence a past and a future for a present; it is not a thing, but 
creates time instead of submitting to it" (Phenomenology 240). Time, therefore, is 
something which is lived or enacted through the body of the subject. 
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty claims that time is a form of significance: "time 
and significance are but one thing" (Phenomenology 426). The subject brings this 
significance to situations and creates them as past, present or future. Merleau-Ponty 
explains this through the image of a table that has accumulated marks from his use of 
it over time: "this table bears traces of my past life, for I have carved my initials on it 
and spilt ink on it. But these traces in themselves do not refer to the past; they are 
present; and in so far as I find in them signs of some 'previous' event, it is because I 
derive my sense of the past from elsewhere, because I carry this particular 
significance within myse(f' (emphasis mine Phenomenology 413). The subject's sense 
oftime is derived from within himself or herself; although an object (the ink spot) is 
eternally present, the subject brings ideas of the past to it in the present. Thus, for 
Merleau-Ponty, the subject's experience of time is similar to his or her experience of 
objects, which have "meaning for us only because [they are] 'what we are'" 
(Phenomenology 430). 
Like Merleau-Ponty, Austerlitz also distinguishes between artificial 
constructions of time and subjective experiences of time. Austerlitz views the modem 
notion of time, which regarded time as a supreme ruler, as an unnatural construction. 
The enormous clock in Antwerp central station, seen as the personification of the 
nineteenth-century conception of time, overshadows their first conversation. In his 
explanations of the architectural history of the station, Austerlitz speaks of how the 
modems revered time as a superior deity. He draws the narrator's attention to the 











trade and capital ... [thus] reign[ing] supreme over these emblems" (Sebald 13). The 
narrator also describes how time's dominance is seen in its significant position in the 
station: "The movements of all the travellers could be surveyed from the central 
position occupied by the clock in Antwerp Station, and conversely all travellers had to 
look up at the clock and were obliged to adjust their activities to its demands" (13-
14). For both Austerlitz and the narrator this modem conception of time appears 
extremely brutal. The narrator describes the violence they feel as they observe the 
movements of the large clock positioned as: 
the dominating feature of the buffet, with a hand some six feet long ... 
During the pauses in our conversations we both noticed what an 
endless length of time went by before another minute had passed, and 
how alarming seemed the movement of that hand, which resembled the 
sword of justice, even though we were expecting it every time it jerked 
forward, slicing off the next one-sixtieth of an hour from the future and 
coming to a halt with such a menacing quiver that one's heart almost 
stopped. (8-9) 
Both Austerlitz and the narrator feel an inherent aversion to this conception of time, 
as it could not be further from their experience. They therefore perceive it as a 
'menacing' and violent usurper, reinforcing the idea that this notion of time is 
unnatural. 
In a long monologue on the nature of time, Austerlitz focuses primarily on 
what time is not, in order to reveal its subjective nature. He remarks to the narrator 
that time is "by far the most artificial of all our inventions, and. .. being bound to the 
planet turning on its own axis [is] no less arbitrary than would be, say, a calculation 











disintegrate ... ,. (141-142). This subjective approach explains some of Austerlitz's 
fundamental questions about the nature of time which he asks in the midst of his 
monologue: "In what way do objects immersed in time differ from those left 
untouched by it? ... Why does time stand eternally still and motionless in one place 
and rush headlong by in another?" (Sebald 142-143). These experiences of the 
fluidity of time are, according to Austerlitz, intrinsically subjective. 
Merleau-Ponty contrasts our notions of time as something progressive, or 
linear, to a subjective time which is incarnate: "time is someone" (Phenomenology 
422). He argues that it is in this "true time ... [where we] learn the nature of flux and 
transience itself" (Phenomenology 415). True, or personal, time is not linear, "but a 
network of intentionalities" (Phenomenology 417). It follows that time is not 
something progressive which rules over subjectivities, as was seen in Austerlitz's 
description of the modem construction of time; rather, according to Merleau-Ponty, 
"the passage of one present to the next is not a thing which I conceive, nor do I see it 
as an onlooker, I perform it: I am myself time, a time which 'abides' and does not 
'flow' or 'change'" (Phenomenology 421). For Merleau-Ponty, this true "time, in our 
primordial experience of it, is not for us a system of objective positions, through 
which we pass, but a mobile setting which moves away from us, like the landscape 
seen through a railway carriage window" (Phenomenology 419-420). Because time 
and the subject are one, time moves as the subject moves. 
Time, therefore, is necessarily understood only in relation to the standpoint of 
the observer. Merleau-Ponty writes that the notion of "change presupposes a certain 
position which I take up and from which I see things in procession before me: there 
are no events without someone to whom they happen and whose finite perspective is 











411). Any understanding of events occurring, or the 'passing' of time, necessarily 
requires a subject to which these events occur; it is the subject who is aware of, or 
determines, their occurrence. In the following example Merleau-Ponty explains how 
time is measured by the observer: 
If the observer sits in a boat and is carried by the current, we may say 
that he is moving downstream towards his future, but the future lies in 
the new landscapes which await him at the estuary, and the course of 
time is no longer the stream itself: it is the landscape as it rolls by for 
the moving observer. Time is, therefore, not a real process, nor an 
actual succession that I am content to record. It arrives from my 
relation to things. Within things themselves, the future and the past are 
in a kind of eternal state of pre-existence and survival ... what is past 
or future for me is present in the world. (Phenomenology 412) 
Time, therefore, is created by the movements of the observer; the objects and 
landscapes are always present, or static. Those landscapes or things which are never 
encountered by the observer, or those events which never happen to someone, are 
never allocated a sense of time: they are time-less, or, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, pre-
existent. 
This brings me to the epigraphs, where both Austerlitz and Merleau-Ponty 
refute the metaphoric description of time as a river. This metaphor describes the flow 
of time as progressive or linear: the river flows from source to mouth. While Merleau-
Ponty disregards the metaphor as being "extremely confused" (Phenomenology 411), 
Austerlitz turns the metaphor inside out, revealing the irregular and unquantifiable 
properties of time. He asks: "if Newton really thought that time was a river like the 











would be this river's qualities, qualities perhaps corresponding to those of water, 
which is fluid, rather heavy and translucent?" (Sebald 142). Through these questions, 
Austerlitz illustrates that it is not the direction of the river that is important, but rather 
its qualities. He continues to explain, through rhetorical questions, that time is 
therefore not linear but irregular: 
And is not human life in many parts of thc earth governed to this day 
less by time than by weather, and thus by an unquantifiable dimension 
which disregards linear regularity, does not progress constantly 
forward but moves in eddies, is marked by episodes of congestion and 
irruption, recurs in ever-changing form, and evolves in no one knows 
what direction? (143) 
These descriptions are aligned more with the qualities of water than with the direction 
of its flow. Austerlitz believes time's movements to be erratic and incalculable. He 
argues against the exactness of the solar constructions by which time is said to be 
measured, remarking that: "the solar day which we take as our guideline does not 
provide any precise measurement" (142). He contends that time is not globally 
synchronized: "Could we not claim ... that time itself has been non-concurrent over 
the centuries and the millennia? It is not so long ago, after all, that it began spreading 
out over everything" (143). This spreading of time would seem to be connected to the 
modern notions and constructions of time, which Austerlitz queries though his 
discussion in Antwerp station. He explains to the narrator that "until the railway 
timetables were synchronized the clocks of Lille and Liege did not keep the same 
time as the clocks of Ghent and Antwerp, and not until they were all standardized 











Therefore, through his factual remarks and rhetorical questions, Austerlitz continually 
shows that any objective construction of time is always artificial. 
Double-Time: Trauma and Repression 
Where Merleau-Ponty's thought on time becomes specifically pertinent to my 
discussion is in his analysis of the memory of trauma where he explores both subjects 
who have experienced physical trauma, such as losing a limb, and those who have 
experienced psychological or emotional trauma. Merleau-Ponty describes the rift that 
occurs in the subject's experience of time as a result of the repression of a traumatic 
experience. Repression, says Merleau-Ponty, occurs when a subject enters "upon a 
certain course of action ... [and encounters] on this course some barrier, and since he 
has the strength neither to surmount the obstacle nor to abandon the enterprise, he 
remains imprisoned in the attempt and uses up his strength indefinitely renewing it in 
spirit" (Phenomenology 83). Monika Langer explains that in cases such as these, "the 
subject remains emotionally involved in a particular past experience to such a degree 
that it imposes itself on the actual present" (34). The memory of the traumatic event 
overpowers the subject's experience of time. 
In these instances of repression the subject continually carries his or her past 
experiences with him or her, never allowing its rightful progression from present to 
past. Langer terms this a "haunting of the present by a particular past experience" 
(emphasis mine, 33). She argues that, according to Merleau-Ponty, this haunting "is 
possible because we all carry our past with us insofar as its structures have become 
'sedimented' in our habitual body" (Langer 33). This haunting occurs because time 











the same impossible future" (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology 83). It is this openness 
to impossibility which causes the subject's unnatural experience of haunted time. 
Merleau-Ponty further explains that trauma causes the subject to experience a 
splitting or layering of time; time is simultaneously experienced on two levels: 
impersonal and personal. "Impersonal time continues its course, but personal time is 
arrested" (Phenomenology 83). He argues that when this layering occurs, personal 
time haunts impersonal time: 
One present among all presents thus acquires an exceptional value; it 
displaces the others and deprives them of their value as authentic 
presents. We continue to be the person who once [ experienced trauma] 
... New perceptions, new emotions even, replace the old ones, but this 
process of renewal touches only the content of our experience and not 
its structure. (Phenomenology 83) 
Here, the 'content' of which Merleau-Ponty speaks would be impersonal time, and the 
'structure,' true or personal time. These two experiences of time are concurrent and 
yet the arresting of personal time always outweighs the experience of impersonal 
time. 
It is important to note that, for Merleau-Ponty, this experience of an arrested 
personal time is not the same as that of continuous memory8. He argues that although 
the past is continually experienced, it is experienced as a true present. For Merleau-
Panty, memories are not analogous with the experience of the true present; rather, 
memories distance us from our experience of the past. He writes: "this fixation [of 
trauma with the past] does not merge into memory; it even excludes memory in so far 
8 Merleau-Ponty's use the tenn 'memory' differs to how I use the term in this paper. For Merleau-
Ponty, memory is associated with empirical notions of perception that he positions himself against. 
Memory, for Merleau-Ponty, is a recollection of the past that is more like a picture of the past then a 











as the latter spreads out in front of us, like a picture, a fonner experience, whereas this 
past which remains our true present does not leave us but remains constantly hidden 
behind our gaze instead of being displayed before it" (Phenomenology 83). The 
nature of the traumatic experience is the antithesis of memory: "it is of its essence to 
survive only as a manner of being and with a certain degree of generality. I forgo my 
constant power of providing myself with 'worlds' in the interest of one of them, and 
for that very reason this privileged world loses its substance and eventually becomes 
no more than a certain dread" (Phenomenology 83). In this way, the traumatic event 
haunts the subject's present, overpowering all experiences of time and slowly 
fennenting into a continual experience of one event that finally abstracts into 
stagnation. 
It is clear that throughout the novel Austerlitz experiences a form of the 
'certain dread' that Merleau-Ponty speaks of. This is because Austerlitz's experience 
of time is a result of his personal trauma. Theorists on Sebald have referred to the way 
in which he writes about the subject's experience of trauma: Long and Whitehead 
refer to trauma in Sebald's works, explaining that "trauma brings about a rupture in 
memory, it breaks continuity with the past and it places identity in question" (Long 
and Whitehead "Introduction" 8), and Wilfried Wilms remarks that "Sebald shares the 
observation that the traumatic event causes a rupture or block, that it dislocates the 
modes and boundaries of our understanding" (182). These continual references to a 
'rupture' resonate with the Merleau-Ponty's explanation of the arresting of personal 
time causing a divide between personal and impersonal time. We see this ruptured 
time in the way in which Austerlitz's experience of trauma has caused him to tum 
away from the experience of time in the world (Sebald 174). It is only later in the 











began - that he is able to recognise the impact it has had on his experience of time. 
Austerlitz explains that in Wilsonova station it seemed to him "as if time had stood 
still since the day when [he] first left Prague" (310). He realises that on that day his 
personal time was, as Merleau-Ponty explained, 'arrested'. Thus Austerlitz's 
experience of layered time is a result of his personal trauma. As a result his 
experience of the past is more real and vivid than anything else and is dominantly 
present in all other presents. 
This subjective experience of trauma and time is most clearly seen in 
Austerlitz's assertion that it is possible to be, as he describes it, "outside of time" 
(143). However, as Austerlitz equates time with the modem construction, here he 
means that it is possible to be outside of this modem notion of time. Austerlitz 
explains that this dislocation from time occurs in the dead, dying and sick, as well as 
those who have experienced trauma: 
Even in a metropolis ruled by time like London ... it is still possible to 
be outside time, a state of affairs which until recently was almost as 
common in backward and forgotten areas of our own country as it used 
to be in the undiscovered continents overseas. The dead are outside 
time, and dying and all the sick at home or in hospitals, and they are 
not the only ones, for a certain degree of personal misfortune is enough 
to cut us off from the past and the future. (143) 
What we come to discover, through the course of the novel, is that Austerlitz's 
personal trauma has caused his experience of this disassociation from time that he 
speaks of. In his initial monologue he hints at this, yet at the time neither he nor the 
narrator is aware that he is speaking of himself. Without understanding it, he explains 











I have never owned a clock of any kind, a bedside alarm or a pocket 
watch, let alone a wristwatch. A clock has always struck me as 
something ridiculous, a thoroughly mendacious object, perhaps 
because I have always resisted the power of time out of some internal 
compulsion which I myself have never understood, keeping myself 
apart from so-called current events in the hope, as I now think, said 
Austerlitz, that time will not pass away, has not passed away, that I can 
turn back and go behind it and there I shall tind everything as it once 
was, or more precisely I shall find that all moments of time have co-
existed simultaneously ... (143-144) 
Similarly, in his description oflver Grove, Austerlitz's experience of time standing 
still reveals his innermost desire: for the past to be a continuous present. He describes 
the billiard room which had been closed up for centuries: "it was as if time, which 
usually runs so irrevocably away, had stood still here, as if the years behind us were 
still to come ... sealed away for so long from the How of the hours and days and the 
succession of generations" (152). Austerlitz instinctively understands the 
timelessness of this room. His experience is just as Merleau-Ponty explained: his 
trauma has caused his past to become a continuous present that, in turn, becomes the 
dominant time in all his experiences. 
This double-time of Austerlitz's becomes apparent to the narrator, who, later 
in the novel, explains that "for Austerlitz certain moments had no beginning or end, 
while on the other hand his whole life had sometimes seemed to him a blank point 
without duration" (165). Austerlitz does, however, come to understand his own 
layering of time and, later in the novel, he explains his perpetual fascination with the 











Such ideas infallibly come to me in places which have more of the past 
about them than the present. For instance, if I am walking through the 
city and look into one of those quiet courtyards where nothing has 
changed for decades, I feel, almost physically, the current of time 
slowing down in the gravitational field of oblivion. It seems to me then 
as if all the moments of our life occupy the same space, as if future 
events already existed and were only waiting for us to find our way to 
them at last, just as when we have accepted an invitation we duly 
arrive in a certain house at a given time. And might it not be ... that 
we also have appointments to keep in the past, in what has gone before 
and is for the most part extinguished, and must go there in search of 
places and people who have some connection with us on the far side of 
time, so to speak? (359-360) 
Austerlitz feels as if all the moments in his life occupy the same space because he is 
carrying all the moments of his life with him. He has not let go of the past, but carries 
it with him into each new instance of the present. Time, therefore, for Austerlitz, is 
continually experienced as layered and he is always more drawn to the past in every 
instance of the present. 
Haunted Time 
Austerlitz's experiences of the past haunting his present cause his ideas of 
time to become intertwined with his ideas of death and the afterlife. This is because 
the past which haunts him is a dead past: the life that he was supposed to have lived in 
Prague with his parents has been destroyed and his parents are, most probably, both 











He is haunted by a traumatic event, but he is also haunted by the death of his parents 
and the destruction of the life that he feels he should have lived. 
As a little boy, Austerlitz's haunted present causes him to develop an interest 
in ghosts. He is drawn to Evan the blacksmith because Evan willingly speaks about 
such things. He tells the narrator about his conversations with Evan: 
Evan told tales of the dead who had been struck down by fate 
untimely, who knew they had been cheated of what was due to them 
and tried to return to life. If you had an eye for them they were to be 
seen quite often, said Evan. At first glance they seemed to be normal 
people, but when you looked more closely their faces would blur or 
flicker slightly at the edges. And they were usually a little shorter than 
they had been in life, for the experience of death, said Evan, 
diminishes us, just as a piece of linen shrinks when you first wash it. 
(74-75) 
It seems as if Austerlitz has experienced a similar fate to the ghosts which Evan 
speaks of. He too has received an untimely blow from fate and feels cheated of the 
life which was due to him. And yet, while he is aware of his own past haunting him, 
for most of his life he is not aware of its reasons. Rather he experiences the haunting 
as a continual uneasiness and a magnified awareness of the world of the dead. 
Austerlitz experiences Evan's tales to be true when he watches the minister's wife on 
her death bed: "the dying women opened her eyes wide and would not move her 
glance from the weak light filtering through the window panes ... Gwendolyn'S body 
seemed to shrink a little, reminding me of what Evan had told me" (90). 
Austerlitz repeats the picture of the dying having wide-open eyes in his 











covers the site of Elias's childhood village and Austerlitz imagines that it had 
swallowed up the rest of the villagers, leaving Elias as the sole survivor of the 
tragedy: "1 imagined all the others - his parents, his brothers and sisters, his relations, 
their neighbours, all the other villagers - still down in the depths, sitting in their 
houses and walking along the road, but unable to speak and with their eyes opened far 
too wide" (72). What is uncanny in this description of Austerlitz's is his obvious 
projection of his suppressed emotion onto Elias's past. Yet, at the time, its correlation 
to his life as a lone survivor of the horrors which his parents experienced is hidden 
from him. 
Austerlitz's experiences of haunting cause him to be sceptical as to the nature 
of the divide between the living and the dead. As a result, Austerlitz experiences the 
world of the dead as almost tangibly present. Again it is in his conversations with 
Evan where he feels his often incomprehensible urges and experiences are given some 
explanation: "it was certainly Evan, said Austerlitz, who once told me that nothing 
but a piece of silk ... separates us from the next world" (76). Austerlitz uses Evan's 
ideas to explain his continual feeling of haunting: "It is a fact that through all the 
years I spent in the manse in Bala 1 never shook off the feeling that something very 
obvious, very manifest in itself was hidden from me. Sometimes it was as if I were in 
a dream and trying to perceive reality; then again I felt as if an invisible twin brother 
were walking beside me, the reverse of a shadow, so to speak" (76). Many years later, 
when Austerlitz reads novels by Balzac, he feels that the author is re-confirming his 
experience. He tells the narrator that "the more melodramatic aspects of [the novel] .. 
. reinforced the suspicion I had always entertained that the border between life and 
death is less impermeable than we commonly think" (395). It is because Austerlitz 











able to extend this experience to that of the 'past' world of the afterlife, and the 
'present' world of the living. These two worlds, for Austerlitz, are layered over each 
other and occupy the same space. 
Haunted Memories 
While Austerlitz is aware of the effects of his experience of time, he is unable 
to explain their cause. In this way Austerlitz is a perfect example of a subject whose 
repression of a traumatic event results in the uncanny. Long and Whitehead explain 
that "for Freud, the uncanny represents something which has long been familiar to us 
but which has been repressed from consciousness, something which ought to have 
remained hidden but has come to light" ("Introduction" 7) and therefore they explain 
that "for Sebald, trauma is inescapably bound up with repetition, and his narratives 
both retrace the past and explore the inescapability of the past in the present ... More 
broadly, he demonstrates that contemporary Europe is unhomely, haunted by the 
spectres of the past and especially by the traumatic history of the Holocaust" 
("Introduction" 8). Austerlitz is continually confronted with things which haunt him: 
they remind him of something which he cannot remember. Austerlitz is therefore 
repeatedly haunted by the unknown: a type of haunting which is particularly 
disturbing. He speaks about how all recollections of his past were buried in the depths 
of his mind during the first few months of his 'new' life in Bala. When he finally does 
begin to remember in T jverpool Street station, and again when he is reunited with 
Vera, he speaks about how the images and memories of the past had been "deeply 











When Austerlitz realises the effect of repression throughout his life, he refers 
to it as a form of censorship which he exercised unknowingly. He explains to the 
narrator that the destructive effect of this repression on his life: 
this self-censorship of my mind, this constant suppression of the 
memories surfacing in me ... demanded ever greater efforts and 
finally, and unavoidably, led to the almost total paralysis of my 
linguistic faculties, the destruction of all my notes and sketches, my 
endless nocturnal peregrinations through London, and the 
hallucinations which plagued me with increasing frequency up to the 
point of my nervous breakdown in the summer of 1992. (198) 
The weight of Austerlitz's suppressed memories eventually causes him to collapse in 
a mental breakdown. A similar experience occurs when he uncovers a memory from 
his traumatic past for the first time: the memory of being met by the Eliases in 
Liverpool Street station. He cannot cope with the return of this memory and he falls 
into a deep, yet disturbed, sleep for over 24 hours. While his body is asleep, many 
memories and their signs which he has been following his whole life begin to surface: 
in the middle of these dreams, said Austerlitz, somewhere behind his 
eyes, he had felt these overwhelming immediate images forcing their 
way out of him, but once he had woken he could recall scarcely any of 
them even in outline. I realized then, he said, how little practice I had 
in using my memory, and conversely how hard I must have always 
tried to recollect as little as possible, avoiding everything which related 
in any way to my unknown past. (197) 
Austerlitz explains the effect of repression as his inability to use his memory. He 











his past. Instead, he fills his mind with facts about architectural history and other 
studies. And yet even these histories and facts, the very things which he attempts to 
use as a buffer between his present self and his traumatic past, only serve as uncanny 
signs of that past. 
Conclusion 
When we understand that Austerlitz's present is haunted by his past, and that 
the experience of this past is more real than that of the present, we begin to 
understand some of the degree of terror which grips Austerlitz through most of his 
life. While it is helpful to understand Austerlitz's experience of time through 
Merleau-Ponty's explanation of the split that occurs between personal and impersonal 
time, it is clear that in some instances, Austerlitz's experience of time is more 
complicated. Austerlitz does not know about his past: he has successfully repressed 
all memory of it. Therefore, when he experiences double-time it is extremely 
disorientating for him as he does not understand the past which he continually 
experiences. At the time he believes he is a madman, or that something is not right 
with the world, and yet he cannot quite put his finger on exactly what it is. As 
opposed to a patient with a phantom limb, as Merleau-Ponty describes, or one who 
undergoes psychoanalysis for a trauma which she or he cannot get over, Austerlitz 
experiences the presence of his past, but both the experience of the past, and its cause, 
are hidden from him. Therefore, Austerlitz attempts to deny the existence of time. He 
tells the narrator: 
It does not seem to me ... that we understand the laws governing the 
return of the past, but I feel more and more as if time did not exist at 











form of stereometry, between which the living and the dead can move 
back and forth as they like, and the longer I think about it the more it 
seems to me that we who are still alive are unreal in the eyes of the 
dead, that only occasionally, and in certain lights, and atmospheric 
conditions, do we appear in their field of vision. (261) 
Thus, for Austerlitz, the subjective nature of time results in his uncertainty that time 
even exists at all. For Austerlitz, the existence of time is inconsequential; rather he is 












F erception: Reading the Landscape 
"[ tried to explain to her and to myself what incomprehensible feelings had been weighing on me over 
the last few days; how I kept thinking, like a madman, that there were mysterious signs and portents all 
around me here; how it even seemed to me as if the silent fac;ades of the buildings knew something 
ominous about me. " 
(Sebald 304) 
Gazing through Darkness: 
In Austerlitz, the themes of darkness and the gaze are central to the novel's 
preoccupation with memory and trauma. Images of penetrating the darkness frame the 
novel, both the in opening scene of the Antwerp Nocturama where the narrator 
notices the exceptionally large and inquiring eyes of the captive animals whose lives 
are lived in darkness, and in the closing scene where the narrator refers to Dan 
Jacobson's account of staring into the dark abyss of the disused mine at Kimberly, 
which he relates to the forgotten past of his family9. In both these accounts, darkness 
symbolises the impenetrability of the past and the shroud of unknowing that 
surrounds those whose lives are captive to suppressed memories. These images of 
darkness are used throughout the novel to symbolise Austerlitz's attempts to shed 
light on the buried memories of his past. The little racoon the narrator studies for 
some time in the Nocturama, a creature distressed by its captivity, foreshadows the 
narrator's introduction to Austerlitz, a character of seriousness, who arrived in Wales 
as a young boy, sent by his mother on a kindertransport to escape the persecution of 
the Jews, and spends his life continuously mulling over the same things but never 











managing to explain their significance. The racoon's obsessive washing of a piece of 
apple remains imprinted in the narrator's memory: 
I watched it for a long time as it sat beside a little stream with a serious 
expression on its face, washing the same piece of apple over and over 
again, as if it hoped that all this washing, which went far beyond any 
reasonable thoroughness, would help it to escape the unreal world in 
which it had arrived, so to speak, through no fault of its own. (Sebald 
2-3) 
As Austerlitz describes his life in the manse in Wales as "some kind of captivity" 
(62), the correlation between these animals, troubled by their imprisonment, and that 
of Austerlitz, suffering from displacement and trauma, is clear. 
Furthermore, the eyes of the animals in the Nocturama are likened to those 
who seek to penetrate the darkness and mysteries of life. The narrator relates how 
"several of them had strikingly large eyes, and the fixed inquiring gaze found in 
certain painters and philosophers who seek to penetrate the darkness which surrounds 
us purely by means oflooking and thinking" (3). Two caption-less photographs, 
showing the eyes of two men, are placed within the text following the narrator's 
observations. Carolin Duttlinger focuses on Sebald's use of photography in her work. 
She writes: "the concepts of the gaze, darkness and visual perception are central to the 
novel as a whole, where the protagonist's reflections on memory, identity, 
architecture and history are inextricably linked to questions of vision and perception" 
(Duttlinger 156-157). While there is an obvious correlation between Sebald's use of 
photography throughout the novel and this discussion of perception, I confine my 











Considering the importance of the gaze in Austerlitz, I would like to propose 
that Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of perception offers a helpful conceptual framework 
through which to speak about the acts of perception that Austerlitz performs and 
which are, as he often feels, performed on him through objects in the landscape. The 
distinction Merleau-Ponty draws between the visible and the invisible provides 
insight into the confusion which Austerlitz experiences in perception. Merleau-Ponty 
proposes that we only perceive objects to be visible which carry an invisible or 
abstract significance for us. This invisible significance is the personal importance 
which embodied perceivers bring to those things which they perceive. Such is the 
case for Austerlitz: all that draws his attention in his perceptual field is charged with 
personal significance. However, his experiences of the visible are disconcerting as the 
invisible significances with which they resonate are repressed from his consciousness, 
or as he says, "deeply buried and locked away within me" (Sebald 221). This results 
in Austerlitz's experience of perception being haunted or troubled. As I discussed in 
chapter two, Austerlitz endeavours to make sense of these disturbances by studying 
the histories of the sites he is attracted to. Yet his historical study of these sites does 
not reveal his personal reading of them, it simply continues to dislocate him: the 
layers of significance all point towards something hidden. However, it appears that 
even when Austerlitz learns of his past life in Prague, which helps him to understand 
his emotional responses to the invisible, his perceptual field, as a result of his trauma, 
still remains partially enveloped in darkness and unknowing. 
On Reading: Visible and Invisible 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body and the act of perception allows for a 











the act of perception. He draws a distinction between the visible, that which is 
perceived, and the invisible, that which is the underlying idea driving the visible. The 
idea, says Merleau-Ponty, "is the invisible of this world, that which inhabits this 
world, sustains it, and renders it visible, its own and interior possibility, the Being of 
this being" (Visible 151). It seems that we are able to view the visible because it 
relates to something invisible that holds importance for us. An idea, or significance, 
that we carry in our bodies resonates with the invisible history of the landscape, thus 
opening the visible up for us to perceive. Merleau-Ponty writes: "Joy and sadness, 
vivacity and obtuseness are data of introspection, and when we invest landscapes or 
other people with these states, it is because we have observed in ourselves the 
coincidence between these internal perceptions and the external signs associated with 
them by the accidents of our constitution" (Phenomenology 24). When the invisible is 
revealed, it is because we decode its presence behind the visible. In this way, reading 
of objects or landscapes involves a reading about the invisible through the visible: the 
act of perception reveals our ideas. 
Merleau-Ponty clearly states that we, in our bodies, bring meaning to objects -
our significance causes them to become visible for us. He proposes that we relate to, 
and view, objects because "[we] carry this particular significance within [ourselves]" 
(Phenomenology 413). Carrol Clarkson explains this process as "the body activat[ing] 
what is invisible" ("Visible and Invisible" 90). Thus our ideas, or our grasp of the 
invisible, reveal a specifically charged world to us: this is our landscape - what we 
are able to see as a result of our bodies acting as vehicles of perception. Since it is the 
invisible quality of something which causes it to be visible, it is the presence of the 
invisible that gives meaning to the visible. Dreyfus and Dreyfus explain that 











appear, which is concealed. For this reason the figure can be said to have meaning 
since ... it refers beyond what is immediately given" (emphasis mine xi). Therefore it 
is the viewer who brings his or her significance to the landscape and views it 
accordingly. Yet, if, as Merleau-Ponty argues, the perceiver and the perceived 
simultaneously shape and are shaped by one another, then we must speak of the 
simultaneous reading that occurs between the viewer and the invisible. 
While we possess and are possessed by the visible; Merleau-Ponty argues that 
we cannot possess the invisible. He explains that the invisible, or the ideas behind the 
visible, elude our grasp: "Each time we want to get at it [the idea] immediately, or lay 
hands on it, or circumscribe it, or see it unveiled, we do in fact feel that the attempt is 
misconceived, that it retreats in the measure that we approach. The explication does 
not give us the idea itself; it is but a second vision of it, a more manageable 
derivative" (Visible 150). Because we may only interact with the invisible as it 
presents itself in space and time through the visible, each view of the visible is 
enacted in new coordinates of space and time and therefore each reading is unique. 
The act of perception, therefore, becomes a form of reading: we bring our 
significance to the landscapes and objects and they act as signifiers of the invisible. 
We read in them the language of the invisible, which, in tum, is still translated 
through our personal meaning. "Just as the function of words is to name," writes 
Merleau-Ponty, "that is, to grasp the nature of what appears to us in a confused way 
and to place before us a recognizable object ... forgetting the viscous, equivocal 
appearance, we go through them straight to the things they present" (Sense 17). 
Likewise, through perception we transform objects and landscapes into signifiers: 
names through which we signify the invisible. This naming is analogous, Merleau-











into visible objects what would, without him, remain walled up in the separate life of 
each consciousness: the vibration of appearances which is the cradle of things" (Sense 
17-18). Similarly, those who view the landscape create visible objects in their field of 
vision that activate and name the invisible significances of the landscape. Therefore, 
without the observer, the invisibles of the landscape would remain concealed. 
Trauma and Un-knowing 
Here I would like to explore the way in which the experience of trauma 
complicates Merleau-Ponty's notions of perception. Cathy Caruth suggests that the 
experience of trauma is doubled in that the survivor of trauma not only experiences 
the trauma of the event, but also the trauma of surviving the event. She explains: "the 
story of trauma, then, as the narrative of a belated experience, far from telling of an 
escape from reality - the escape from death, or from its referential force - rather 
attests to its endless impact on life ... at the core of these stories, I would suggest, is 
thus a kind of double telling, the oscillation between a crisis o.ldeath and the 
correlative crisis of life: between the story of the unbearable nature of an event and 
the story of the unbearable nature of its survival" (7). In her discussion on the effects 
of trauma, Caruth explains that paradoxically, those who survive traumatic 
experiences are unable to comprehend their perceptions of both the event and its 
repetitions: 
Traumatic experience, beyond the psychological dimension of 
suffering it involves, suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct 
seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it; 
that immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness. The 











consciousness but intrude repeatedly on sight - thus suggest a larger 
relation to the event that extends beyond what can simply be seen or 
what can be known, and is inextricably tied up with belatedness and 
incomprehensibility that remain at the heart of this repetitive seeing. 
(emphasis mine 91-92) 
The impact of trauma on the vision or gaze of the subject, Caruth argues, is always 
experienced as an inability to know. These subjects are faced with visible occurrences 
that they are unable to comprehend, and yet their inability to understand does not 
prevent these visions from reoccurring within their perceptual fields. This experience 
of not knowing is precisely what Austerlitz experiences throughout his interactions 
with landscapes, buildings and objects. His experience of trauma has resulted in a 
belatedness and an inability to know the past as it visibly presents itself to him. The 
experiences of trauma and of not knowing therefore affect his visual perceptions. 
Disturbing Visibles 
Within the context of both Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of perception, and 
Caruth's explanation of the un-knowing that occurs in those who have experienced 
trauma, I would like to propose that Austerlitz's reading of the landscapes around him 
is both emotionally and visually disturbing. Through his body Austerlitz activates 
specifically charged landscapes and yet the significance of these landscapes is hidden 
from him as a result of his 'un-knowing'. Thus, it would seem that Austerlitz is 
caught between his body, which carries his traumatic past continually with it and 
views the landscape accordingly, and the repression of his mind: the inability to know 
the significance of the visible as it presents itself to him. Austerlitz's perceptual 











activates the visible, he is able to see it without necessarily comprehending its 
underlying meaning. As a result, Austerlitz's perceptual reading of the landscape 
haunts him: he cannot interpret the significance of the visible and yet, as Caruth 
argues, its visibility repeatedly presents itself to him. 
Throughout his narrative, Austerlitz frequently explains to the narrator how 
although he is drawn to places by urges which mystify him, he is aware that there is 
something significant behind these impulses. Austerlitz reads the importance of these 
places in the strong emotional responses which he experiences in them. Interestingly, 
Austerlitz's emotions are most often engaged in the sites of railway stations. As a 
student in Paris, Austerlitz finds himself continually drawn to the railway stations, 
where he often sits for some time. He explains his emotional response to these 
stations: "he had quite often found himself in the grip of dangerous and entirely 
incomprehensible currents of emotion in the Parisian railway stations, which, he said, 
he regarded as places marked by both blissful happiness and profound misfortune" 
(Sebald 45). Similarly, years later in England, Austerlitz spends many hours in 
Liverpool Street station where his heart is moved by something indiscernible. During 
his nervous breakdown, in which he beings to walk the streets of London at night, 
Austerlitz is often "irresistibly drawn" (180) to Liverpool Street station. He obeys 
these urges and is surprised by his strong emotional response to the site: 
Whenever I got out at Liverpool Street station ... I would stay there at 
least a couple of hours, sitting on a bench with other passengers who 
were already tired in the early morning, or standing somewhere, 
leaning on a handrail and feeling that constant wrenching inside me, a 
kind of heartache which, as I was beginning to sense, was caused by 











What Austerlitz fails to understand at the time is that his emotional response to the 
history of the sunhing which he reads in this site, is a personal response. He attempts 
to explain the heartache he feels, without recognizing that his own life is linked to 
these narratives of pain: "I often wondered whether the pain and suffering 
accumulated on this site over the centuries had ever really ebbed away, or whether 
they might not still, as I sometimes thought when I felt a cool breath of air on my 
forehead, be sensed as we pass through them on our way through the station halls and 
up and down the flights of steps" (183). As I discussed in chapter two, Austerlitz 
explores the history of the site in order to understand the feelings which his body 
reads in these stations: he uses his knowledge of architectural history as a 
compensatory memory, or, here, as a way in which to explain his emotional response. 
Interestingly, it is through his studies of architecture, and railway architecture 
in particular, that Austerlitz is unwittingly naming his past through his reading of the 
landscape. His research persistently points him to the histories and narratives of 
suffering which he does not realize are inextricably bound up in his own story of pain. 
Austerlitz is following the patterns of suffering without seeing that his own life is 
imbricated within the wider narrative of the persecution of the Holocaust. The very 
fact that the sites of initial trauma in his life were in railway stations is itself telling 
enough: both the separation from his mother and nursery maid in Wilsonova station, 
and the traumatic experience of being met by foreign foster parents in Liverpool 
Street station. Austerlitz's own explanation of his choice of study is ominously 
revealing: "in his studies of railway architecture ... he could never quite shake off 
thoughts of the agony of leave-taking and the fear of foreign places, although such 
ideas were not part of architectural history proper" (16-17). Austerlitz could not 











leave-taking' and his own 'fear of foreign places' which he brings to these sites. His 
reading of railway stations is precisely what his body activates in these places; and 
yet, he is unable to understand the personal significance his emotions betray. 
As a result, Austerlitz experience of the visible is uncannily disturbing. He 
feels troubled by his inability to read the meaning in the landscapes which surround 
him. When he visits Marienbad with Marie, some years before he discovers traces of 
his personal history in Prague and learns of the Holocaust, Austerlitz feels haunted by 
the landscapes of the spa. Even as they approach the town, Austerlitz's body reveals a 
landscape which produces a sense of unease within him. He recounts to the narrator: 
"as we approached Marienbad ... darkness had fallen, and I remember ... that a 
slight sense of disquiet brushed me as we ... slid into the town, which was sparsely 
illuminated" (291-292). This sense of anxiety is only heightened as the light of day 
offers more visibility and Austerlitz is faced with an uncanny landscape. The 
following morning, when Austerlitz looks out of the hotel window at the buildings of 
the town he correctly reads their invisible promptings to remember, and yet he does 
not understand he is reading them: "At some time in the past, I thought, I must have 
made a mistake, and now I am living the wrong life" (298). Later, when Austerlitz 
walks through the town with Marie, he feels haunted by something invisible: 
On a walk through the deserted town ... I kept feeling as if someone 
else were walking beside me, or as if something had brushed against 
me. Every new view that opened out before us as we turned a corner, 
every fac,;ade, every flight of steps looked to me both familiar and 
utterly alien. I felt that the decrepit state of these once magnificent 
buildings, with their broken gutters, walls blackened by rainwater, 











boarded up or clad with corrugated iron, precisely ret1ected my own 
state of mind, which I could not explain either to myself or to Marie. 
(298-299) 
Austerlitz is aware that something in the surrounding buildings of the town resonates 
with his emotions, and yet this leaves him in a state of confusion. He cannot 
comprehend how he could feel that this entirely new landscape is familiar, and he 
does not understand what it is within this landscape which he feels he should 
remember. 
Austerlitz attempts to describe his uncanny experiences in Marienbad as trying 
to read a well-known name and yet being unable to do so. His inability to decipher 
what he believes should be obvious causes Austerlitz to feel intense emotion: "I tried 
to explain that something or other unknown wrenched my heart here in Marienbad, 
something very obvious like an ordinary name or a term which one cannot remember 
for the sake of anyone or anything in the world" (300) 10. Austerlitz is aware that it is 
his inability to remember that causes his continual unease in Marienbad, however, 
what he cannot determine is what it is which he feels he should remember. 
As a result Austerlitz feels as if the landscape is reading him. He is aware that 
there are signs in the landscape of Marienbad which disturb him, and therefore he 
feels as if these signs are able to read something in him which he himself cannot 
interpret. This brings me to the epigraph, where Austerlitz describes this feeling of 
being read as bordering on madness: "I tried to explain to her and to myself what 
incomprehensible feelings had been weighing on me over the last few days; how 1 
kept thinking, like a madman, that there were mysterious signs and portents all around 
10 This echoes my discussion in chapter two, where I proposed that architecture acts as a form of 
naming and therefore that the reading of landscapes and buildings if a reading of the signifiers present 











me here; how it even seemed to me as if the silent fa<;:ades of the buildings knew 
something ominous about me" (304). It is only once Austerlitz has uncovered traces 
of his past that he begins to understand this disturbing feeling of being remembered. 
When he retraces his journey on the kindertransport, Austerlitz disembarks at Pilsen 
and takes a photograph of the station's architecture, which he feels remembers himll: 
All I remember of Pilscn, where we stopped for some time, said 
Austerlitz, is that I went out on the platform to photograph the capital 
of a cast-iron column which had touched some chord of recognition in 
me. What made me uneasy at the sight of it, however, was not the 
question of whether the complex form of the capital, now covered with 
a puce-tinged encrustation, had really impressed itself on my mind 
when I passed through Pilsen with the children's transport in the 
summer of 1939, but the idea, ridiculous in itselt~ that this cast-iron 
column, which with its scaly surface seemed almost to approach the 
nature of a living being, might remember me and was, if I may so put 
it ... a witness to what I could no longer recollect for myself (311) 
Here Austerlitz states clearly that he believes that the objects in the landscape perform 
some sort of remembering for him. Where he is unable to remember, he believes that 
those objects and landscape with which he resonates, those which he is drawn to, 
remember for him. 
II Premised on his belief in the intersubjectivity of perception, which he describes as a dialogue, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that those things which we perceive, or gaze upon, in tum gaze back at us. He 
writes that: "the vision he [the seer] exercises, he also undergoes from the things, such that, as many 
painters have said, I feel myself looked at by the things, my activity is equally passivity ... so that the 
seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and is seen" (emphasis 
mine Visible 139). Therefore, in the act of perception, Merleau-Ponty says that there is always a 
simultaneous exchange of the gaze: both see and are seen. However, in Austerlitz's case, while he feels 
himself being looked at or remembered by the things, he is unable to understand his own gaze and 
therefore he does not feel this sense of reciprocity in the act of perception which Merleau-Ponty 
describes. Until Austerlitz understands the fundamental narcissism in his own gaze, he experiences the 











Encountering the Invisible 
After he is re-united with Vera, and hears her descriptions of his childhood, 
Austerlitz understands his emotional responses to different sites in retrospect. The 
sensations that he experienced in the landscapes of Europe, and the incomprehensible 
ways in which his actions were often inspired by these emotions, were caused by the 
past that was buried within him. Austerlitz describes how, during his student days in 
Paris, he used to "walk through the empty Sunday streets taking hundreds of banlieu-
photographs, as I called them, pictures which in their very emptiness, as I realised 
only later, reflected my orphaned frame of mind" (370). The emptiness of the content 
of these photographs reveals Austerlitz's lack of familial ties; yet, it is only once he 
discovers his true family and learns about their destruction, that Austerlitz is able to 
understand the personal significance of these 'orphaned' photographs. 
The invisible meaning of the architecture that Austerlitz has studied his entire 
life is simultaneously revealed with his recollection of a suppressed memory. Visions 
of architecture frame the return of Austerlitz's memory of his arrival in Liverpool 
Street station as a child. When he enters the Ladies' Waiting Rom, Austerlitz sees 
labyrinth-like architecture: 
From time to time, and just for a split second, I saw huge halls open 
up, with rows of pillars and colonnades leading far into the distance, 
with vaults and brickworks arches bearing on them many-storeyed 
structures, with flights of stone steps, wooden stairways and ladders, 
all leading the eye on and on ... (190) 
These architectural structures act as a catalyst for Austerlitz's repressed memories: 











vision of his four-year-old self being met by the Eliascs. In recounting this poignant 
event in his life, Austerlitz explains: 
In the middle of this vision ... I could not stop wondering whether it 
was a ruin or a building in the process of construction that I had 
entered ... in any case, the crucial point was ... the scraps of memory 
beginning to drift through the outlying regions of my mind ... 
memories like this came back to me in the disused Ladies' Waiting-
Room of Liverpool Street station, memories behind and within which 
many things much further back in the past seemed to lie, all 
interlocking like the labyrinthine vaults J saw in the dusty grey light, 
and which seemed to go on and on for ever. In fact, I felt, said 
Austerlitz, that the waiting-room where I stood as if dazed contained 
all the hours of my past life, all the suppressed and extinguished fears 
and wishes I had ever entertained ... (191-193) 
Austerlitz understands the connection between the labyrinth-like structure which he 
perceives and the seemingly disconnected episodes and memories of his life: they all 
form a network through which he re-discovers his past. Once this initial memory 
surfaces, Austerlitz's mind returns to all the signs which have told his story all along. 
On returning home from the station he falls into a deep, prolonged sleep in which it 
seems he is presented with the invisible significance of all the landscapes, buildings 
and objects which have haunted him his entire life: 
In that sleep ... I was at the innermost heart of a star-shaped fortress, a 
dungeon entirely cut off from the outside world, and I had to try 
finding my way into the open, passing down long, low passages which 











was a nightmarish, never-ending dream, with its main plot interrupted 
several times by other episodes ... in the middle of these dreams, said 
Austerlitz, somewhere behind his eyes, he had felt these overwhelming 
immediate images forcing their way out of him, but once he had 
woken he could recall scarcely any of them even in outline. (196-197) 
In retrospect, Austerlitz is able to correctly read these visible signs, and yet, while in 
the dream he feels as if things inside him are surfacing - the most obvious 
interpretation of these being his repressed memories - on waking, however, Austerlitz 
is unable to remember. 
Austerlitz finds himself caught between the knowledge of his traumatic past 
and the suppression mechanisms that he has, as a response to this trauma, cultivated 
his entire life. On waking from the dream he is finally aware of the effects of the 
'self-censorship' which he has perfonned throughout his life. He explains: "I realised 
then ... how little practice I had in using my memory, and conversely how hard I 
must always have tried to recollect as little as possible, avoiding everything which 
related in any way to my unknown past ... " (197). Austerlitz's trauma therefore 
complicates his perceptual experience; as a result of the layers of avoidance and 
repression which govern his memory, he cannot fully read the visible. 
However, despite these complications, once Austerlitz has some knowledge of 
his past history, his engagements with landscapes become personal. Terezin fortress, 
which Austerlitz visits after he has been re-united with Vera, becomes one of the first 
significantly charged landscapes which he is able to read on a personal level. His 
readings occur in both minute detail, such as the correlation between the "octofoil 











Austerlitz lived in Prague, and the star-shaped ground plan of the fortress, and in 
greater resonances with the objects of Terezin Bazaar and the Ghetto Museum. 
Austerlitz reads the objects in the window of the Terezin Bazaar with the 
understanding that his body, like the objects which he perceives, has escaped the 
destruction of the Nazi persecution. Austerlitz perceives his own shadow in amongst 
the objects in the window display: 
It was a long time before I could tear myself away from staring at the 
hundreds of different objects, my forehead pressed against the cold 
window, as if one of them or their relationship with each other must 
provide an unequivocal answer to the many questions I found it 
impossible to ask in my mind ... what, I asked myself, said Austerlitz, 
might be the significance of the river never rising from any source, 
never flowing out into any sea but always back into itself, what was 
the meaning of ... the squirrel forever perched in the same position, or 
of the ivory-coloured porcelain group of a hero on horseback turning 
to look back ... in order to raise up with his outstretched left arm an 
innocent girl already bereft of her last hope, and to save her from a 
cruel fate not revealed to the observer? They were all as timeless as 
that moment of rescue, perpetuated but for ever just occurring, these 
ornaments, utensils and mementoes stranded in the Terezin bazaar, 
objects that for reasons one could never know had outlived their 
former owners and survived the process of destruction, so that I could 












Austerlitz is able to read the history of the trauma in the objects on display because he 
understands them, as Merleau-Ponty argued, through his own bodily experiences. 
Furthermore, in Terezin's Ghetto Museum, Austerlitz perceives the human 
presence in the cultural objects which he sees. He describes how the collection of 
personal items, manufactured goods and the official lists and figures together tell the 
story of the terrifying victimization of the internees of the ghetto: "I saw pieces of 
luggage brought to Terezin by the internees from Prague and Pilsen ... and countless 
other places; the items such as handbags, belt buckles, clothes brushes and combs 
which they had made in the various workshops ... I saw balance sheets, registers of 
the dead, lists of every imaginable kind ... " (279-280). Austerlitz is haunted by the 
human presence of these cultural objects. As Merleau-Ponty says, "In the cultural 
object, I feel the close presence of others beneath the veil of anonymity. Someone 
uses the pipe for smoking, the spoon for eating, the bell for summoning, and it is 
through the perception of a human act and another person that the perception of the 
cultural world could be verified" (Phenomenology 348). These objects have specific 
significance for Austerlitz, as it is in this museum that he finally faces the history of 
the Holocaust that he had, until now, excluded from his perceptual field: 
having for the first time acquired some idea of the history of the 
persecution which my avoidance system had kept from me for so long, 
and which now, in this place, surrounded me on all sides. I studied the 
maps of the Greater German Reich and its protectorates, which had 
never before been more than blank spaces in my otherwise well-
developed sense of topography, I traced the railways lines running 
through them ... and learned of the deliberate wastage and discarding 











victims, the routes by which they were taken to what destinations, 
what names they had borne in life and what they and their guards 
looked like. (Sebald 278-279) 
Austerlitz's reading of these objects occurs both through his own body and through 
the importance which the museum ascribes to them. Because the objects are situated 
within a museum, their history has already been written; they therefore act as a way of 
revealing to Austerlitz the history he had long repressed. 
However, although Austerlitz is confronted with the harsh realities of the 
Holocaust through the mediation of the museum, and through his understanding of his 
own body and its history, there remains an element of the un-known in his experience 
of the visible. Even in their undeniable presentation of human history, the objects in 
the museum elude his understanding: "I understood it all now, and yet I did not 
understand it, for every detail that was revealed to me as 1 went through the museum 
from room to room and back again, ignorant as 1 feared 1 had been through my own 
fault, far exceeded my comprehension" (279). This brings me back to Caruth's 
assertion that those who experience a degree of trauma are faced with the paradoxical 
experience of seeing without comprehending: "the most direct seeing of a violent 
event may occur as an absolute inability to know it" (91). In the museum, Austerlitz 
sees objects that attest to the violence of the Holocaust, and yet he feels unable to 
fully grasp what he sees. On returning from Terezin, Austerlitz spends the night 
plagued by an endless succession images: 
... whether I kept my eyes wide open or closed, all through the night 
I saw pictures from Terezin and the Ghetto Museum, the bricks of the 
fortification walls, the display window of the Bazaar, the endless lists 











Bristol in Salzburg and Vienna, the closed gates I had photographed, 
the grass growing between the cobblestones, a pile of briquettes 
outside a cellar entrance, the squirrels' glass eye and the two forlorn 
figures of Agata and Vera pulling the laden toboggan through the 
driving snow to the Trade Fair building at HoleSovice. Only towards 
morning did I sleep briefly, but even then, in the deepest 
unconsciousness, the flow of pictures did not cease but instead 
condensed into a nightmare ... (Sebald 283-284) 
As Caruth suggested, these images repeatedly present themselves to Austerlitz, 
despite his knowledge of his own history, and continue to haunt him both consciously 
and subconsciously. 
Thus, even when Austerlitz begins to understand the invisible significance that 
he, in his body, brought to the landscapes and objects which he has studied, the 
traumatic nature of his history refuses full disclosure. After he returns from Bohemia, 
Austerlitz suffers a nervous breakdown under the strain of the simultaneous 
knowledge and incomprehension of the root of his trauma. He admits to the narrator: 
... it was obviously of little use that I had discovered the sources of 
my distress and, looking back over all the past years, could now see 
myself with the utmost clarity as that child suddenly cast out of his 
familiar surroundings: reason was powerless against the sense of 
rejection and annihilation which I had always suppressed, and which 
was now breaking through the walls of its confinement. (Sebald 322) 
As he begins to encounter the invisible, Austerlitz's experience of the visible becomes 
further confused. He experiences acute attacks of anxiety in which his vision is 











than bringing clarity and cohesion to his perceptual experience, Austerlitz's 
encounters with the invisible (his traumatic history) further confuse and fragment his 
vision: " ... once, after a long and painful contraction, I actually visualized myself 
being broken up from within, so that parts of my body were scattered over a dark and 












Conclusion: T ext-scapes 
..... the darkness does not lift but becomes yet heavier as I think how little we can hold in mind, how 
everything is constantly lapsing into oblivion with every extinguished life, how the world is, as it were, 
draining itself in that the history of countless places and objects which themselves have no power of 
f11eI1101Y is never heard, never described or passed on. " 
(.')ebald 30-3 I) 
This concluding chapter works as a coda: it shifts to focus on the fonnal 
aspects of the novel, while still considering their correlation to the themes explored in 
the previous chapters. Sebald's text is itself a fonn of landscape: his narrative 
technique, with its emphasis on the visual in conjunction with the verbal, presents its 
readers with a textual landscape (or text-scape) to be perceived. Sebald's unique use 
of photographs in his work creates a visual text that requires personal reading. While 
the photographs are generally placed at significant parts of the text, they have no 
captions or explicit explanations. The reader must engage with these visual aspects of 
the text through their own perception and understanding of the text. In this chapter I 
explore the way in which Sebald's novel presents its readers with a textual landscape 
through which they are invited to perceive and remember. First I explore the 
metaphorical nature of Austerlitz's table of photographs, after which I examine how 
Sebald's fonnal technique mirrors the thematic concerns of the novel: it provides a 
textual space for memory, a subjective experience of time, and passes on the 












One of the most telling passages in Sebald's Austerlitz occurs when the 
narrator, on his first visit to the protagonist's home in Alderney street, learns of the 
way in which Austerlitz seeks to piece together and understand the fragments of his 
own story. On showing his guest the front room of his house, which is bare, except 
for an ottoman and a table, and painted entirely in shades of grey, Austerlitz describes 
a game that he plays with the photographs he has taken and collected throughout his 
life: 
The front room, into which Austerlitz took me first, had nothing in it 
but a large table, also varnished matt grey, with several dozen 
photographs lying on it, most of them dating quite a long way back and 
rather worn at the edges. Some of the pictures were already familiar to 
me, so to speak: pictures of empty Belgium landscapes, stations and 
metro viaducts in Paris, the palm house in the Jardin des Plantes, 
various moths and other night-flying insects, ornate dovecotes, Gerald 
Fitzpatrick on the airfield near Quy, a number of heavy doors and 
gateways. Austerlitz told me that he sometimes sat here for hours, 
laying out these photographs or others from his collection the wrong 
way up, as if playing a game of patience, and that then, one by one, he 
turned them over, always with a new sense of surprise at what he saw, 
pushing the pictures back and forth and over each other, arranging 
them in an order depending on their family resemblances, or 
withdrawing them from the game until either there was nothing left but 
the grey table top, or he felt exhausted by the constant effort of 












The game which Austerlitz plays with these photographs is similar to piecing together 
a puzzle. However, unlike puzzle pieces, the photographs, in their square or 
rectangular shapes, resist fitting into one another; each piece can be placed anywhere 
on the table and may be arranged alongside any other piece. As Austerlitz's puzzle 
has no pre-determined fonn, his photographic game of inferences is never-ending. 
The significance of this game of photographs lies in its metaphoric depiction 
of Austerlitz's life. The black and white photographs provide a record of all the sites 
and buildings that Austerlitz has studied and visited, the people who have int1uenced 
his life and other things which he feels himself irresistibly drawn to, such as animals 
and insects. By re-arranging these images, Austerlitz once again seeks to discover the 
meaning behind the invisible promptings that have governed his life. There is a clear 
connection between these photographs and their ability to both reveal and preserve 
memories. Therefore, through reorganizing these photographs, Austerlitz both relives 
his memories and seeks to uncover the hidden meaning of his trauma. Long and 
Whitehead refer to this photographic game: "In his description of Austerlitz's scrutiny 
of photographs, Sebald deliberately evokes the concept of working through, 
suggesting that the photograph preserves an event to which the subject can only later 
attach meaning" ("Intro" 14). Yet, they point out that just as Austerlitz's game with 
the photographs resists a final arrangement or answer, so Sebald 
undennines the possibility of working through by emphasising the 
precariousness and the transience of both photograph and memory ... 
Sebald repeatedly emphasises the aporia of traumatic experience. 
Although photographs can aid a moment of recollection, this memory 
will inevitably tum out to be t1eeting and will rapidly fade into the 











Thus, Austerlitz's frequent repositioning of the photographs continually reveals new 
perspectives and new readings of his trauma. 
Furthermore, the photographic game acts as a metaphor for the structure of the 
novel as a whole. Sebald's text works in a similar way to the table of photographs. 
There are many photographs (87 in total) scattered through the body of the text, and 
these are juxtaposed with fragmentary descriptions of buildings, people, animals, 
places etc. All these images - both literal and textual -provide the reader with a table 
upon which to work through and reveal both their perceived meaning in Austerlitz's 
story as well as their own memories and personal significances which they bring to 
these images. 
A Space for Memory 
Most critics who have written about Sebald refer to his use of photographs, 
pointing out that the relationship between photography and memory is evident in all 
of Sebald's texts. Sebald himself, in an interview with Maya Jaggi where they 
discussed his use of photography, emphasised the importance of memory in literature: 
"The moral backbone of literature is about that whole question of memory ... 
Without memories, there wouldn't be any writing: the specific weight an image or 
phrase needs to get across to the reader can only come from things remembered ... " 
(Jaggi). Sebald's use of photographs in Austerlitz is in keeping with the hybrid genre 
of his entire oeuvre. Where architecture, as I discussed in chapter two, works as the 
mnemonic space in which Austerlitz discovers many of his own memories, the 
photographs in Austerlitz, and the text which surrounds them, become the space in 
which these memories are preserved. Kilbourn explains this shift from architecture to 











"for Augustine the written and read text itself inevitably replaces architecture as the 
metaphor for memory"(144). Therefore, the photographs and the text of Austerlitz 
create a new mnemonic space. 
Austerlitz is aware of the relationship between photographs and memory. 
Although he is strictly speaking an architectural historian, Austerlitz is also a prolific 
photographer. He explains his fascination with developing photographs: "In my 
photographic work I was always especially entranced, said Austerlitz, by the moment 
when the shadows of reality, so to speak, emerge out of nothing on the exposed paper, 
as memories do in the middle of the night, darkening again if you try to cling to them, 
just like a photographic print left in the developing bath too long" (Sebald 109). 
Carolin Duttlinger has argued that this passage is not so much about the relationship 
between photography and memory, but the inability to remember: 
it is the latency and transience of the photographic image, rather than 
its permanence and stability, which serve as a model for the process of 
memory, as the images of neither photography nor memory can be 
grasped and arrested, and are hence both prone to disappearance, 
photography is thus figured as a model not for the permanence of 
memory but for the phenomenon of forgetting. (158) 
However, it is this inability to remember which causes Austerlitz to continually seek 
knowledge through repeatedly viewing his photographs. 
Austerlitz feels that photographs have a memory of their own, and possibly 
remember for him in ways similar to his experience with the architectural structure of 
Pilsen station as I discussed in chapter three 12• When Austerlitz is confronted with the 
two photographs (one of himself dressed as a pageboy, and the other of a theatre 











stage) which Vera shows him, he experiences this uncanny feeling of being 
remembered; his feelings are described in the words of Vera, who spoke, as he 
recounts to the narrator, 
of the mysterious quality peculiar to such photographs when they 
surface from oblivion. One has the impression, she said, of something 
stirring in them, as if one caught small sighs of despair ... as if the 
pictures had a memory of their own and remembered us, remembered 
the roles that we, the survivors, and those no longer among us had 
played in their former lives. (Sebald 258) 
These two photographs haunt Austerlitz. He is speechless and emotionally numb 
when confronted with a photograph of himself of which he has no recollection. Elinor 
ShatTer offers a helpful explanation of Austerlitz's response, commenting that 
"photographs as deployed by Sebald ... have this ominous quality of ruling over and 
containing the experience of our dead selves to which we have no more access, and 
for those who did not directly experience their own history the objectified forms of it 
are the more menacing and the more precious" (51). Austerlitz translates his 
emotional response to these photographs into feeling a moral obligation to his dead 
self: "I examined every detail [of the photograph] ... and in doing so I always felt the 
piercing, inquiring gaze of the page boy who had come to demand his dues, who was 
waiting in the grey light of dawn on the empty field for me to accept the challenge 
and avert the misfortune lying ahead of him" (Sebald 260). Although there is nothing 
the older Austerlitz may do to prevent the misfortune which befell his younger self, 
Austerlitz does understand his responsibility to remember, and pass on, the story of 











In order for their memories to be preserved, photographs need to be 
accompanied with narration. J.1. Long argues that photography should not be 
considered as a primary form of memory, but "as a kind of belated symptom of 
familial and collective history that needs to be mediated through a process of 
narration in order to become knowable and communicable" ("History" 127). 
Austerlitz, therefore, in both telling his story, and handing over his photographs to the 
narrator, places the narrator in the position to best communicate his history. In their 
final meeting, Austerlitz gives his house keys to the narrator: "he gave me the key to 
his house in Aldemey Street. I could stay there whenever I liked, he said, and study 
the black and white photographs which, one day, would be all that was left of his life" 
(Sebald 408). As readers, we are led to believe that the photographs in the text are 
from the collection which Austerlitz entrusts to the narrator. However, some of these 
photographs are most probably the work of the narrator himself as they are placed in 
sections of the text where the narrator recounts his own descriptions and perceptions: 
the photographs of Breendonk fortress, the fire in Lucerne station and the barbed-wire 
view from the narrator's hotel in Astridsplein. 
Telling Time 
The sense of time portrayed in the novel mirrors Austerlitz's experience of 
time as I discussed it in chapter two: narrative time is personal time. Amir Eshel has 
argued that Sebald's works create their own sense of time which is not linear or 
bound to standardized clock-time: "if clocks tell time, Sebald's narratives tell what 
wanes, what transpires in time. Just as clocks count time - in English, 'to count' 
denotes 'to tell,' 'to account,' 'to reckon' ... - his work does not simply count off 











(91). This approach to time is subjective; its progress is unsystematic and, as 
Austerlitz mused in the Greenwich observation room, it "stand[ s] eternally still and 
motionless in one place, and rush[es] headlong by in another ... [it] moves in eddies, 
is marked by episodes of congestion and irruption, recurs in ever-changing form, and 
evolves in no one-knows what direction" (Sebald 142-143). This is the reader's 
experience of time in the novel: it moves in haphazard arrangements. There are vast 
gaps of time, even decades, between Austerlitz and the narrator's chance and 
scheduled meetings, and yet, for the most part, these spaces of time seem 
inconsequential and are often not even referred to by either interlocutor: "without 
wasting any words on the coincidence of our meeting again after all this time, 
Austerlitz took up the conversation that evening in the bar of the Great Eastern Hotel 
more or less where it had last been broken off' (56-57). The way in which Austerlitz 
resumes his narrative evidences his disregard for the space of time that has passed 
between their meetings. It is as if their encounters occur on a single plane of time for 
Austerlitz and may be paused and resumed regardless of whether a single day or two 
decades of 'standardized', or impersonal, time have passed in the interim. 
Austerlitz's personal sense of time is evident in his unsystematic narrative. His 
conversations with the narrator disregard a linear approach: the retelling of the past 
occurs in amongst present musings. The narrator often points to this erratic flow of 
Austerlitz's narrative, commenting after a long digression with temporal markers such 
as" ... continued Austerlitz, who had drifted for some time in his memories ... " 
(163), or bridging long pauses in conversation with short comments such as "- I 
believe, Austerlitz went on after some time ... " (110). Austerlitz's narrative often 
moves in a circular fashion, creating endless digressions on subjects, such as the life 











the linear progression of his narrative, serve the greater function of adding to its 
overall meaning. 
The layering of time which Austerlitz experiences is revealed in the ways in 
which his narrative conflates the past and the present. Often the shadow of the tragic 
future infiltrates Austerlitz's telling of the past. For instance, before he describes his 
friendship with Gerald Fitzpatrick, Austerlitz makcs reference to Gerald's untimely 
death. As we are introduced to Gerald, we discover that his death reminds Austerlitz 
of the story of the homing pigeon who managed to find her way home, despite having 
broken her wing (Sebald 110). Similarly, Austerlitz recounts the disintegration of his 
relationship with Marie de Verneuil in Marienbad before he describes the initial 
stages of their friendship in Paris. Therefore, the sense of layered time which occurs 
in both these accounts - the reader is confronted with the destruction of the future 
superimposed on the present telling - echoes Austerlitz's experience of the past 
layering over all his present encounters. 
Furthermore, the inconclusive nature of Austerlitz's narrative opposes a linear 
construction of time. Martin Swales argues that this inconclusiveness is a 
characteristic of all Sebald's texts and is a necessary part of their narrative technique 
which avoids explanations: "inconclusiveness is compounded by the unmistakable 
refusal on the part of the text to psychologise or explain, to fill in emotional or 
cognitive gaps" ("Intertext" 84). We know that Austerlitz is in search of traces of his 
father, and yet there is no mention of the outcome of this search. Austerlitz's narrative 
ends abruptly, with a description of the graveyard next to his house, followed by the 
narrator's description of his second visit to Breendonk fortress. Nothing more is 
offered and the text seems incomplete. Eshel argues that Sebald's prose constitute a 











of chronology, succession, comprehension, and closure - a poetics that rather than 
depicting and commenting on the historical event in time, constitutes an event, 
becomes the writing of a different, a literary time" (74). This narrative, or literary 
time, therefore, in its avoidance of linearity and completion, aligns itself with a 
subjective experience of time similar to that of Austerlitz. 
Passing On 
As Austerlitz's narrative is mediated through a narrator, it becomes more than 
just his own biography: it is combined with the personal narrative of the narrator. 
There are many similarities between Austerlitz and the narrator which cause the 
distinction between their narratives to become even further confused. Very little is 
explained about the narrator~there is no mention of his name or occupation~which 
adds to the lack of distinction between the narrator and Austerlitz. The narrator's own 
reflections often echo those of Austerlitz, leaving readers often confused as to who is 
speaking, or whose memories belong to whom. For instance, the opening sentence of 
the novel could easily be the words of Austerlitz himself, and yet they are the 
narrator's: "In the second half of the 1960s I travelled repeatedly from England to 
Belgium partly for study purposes, partly for reasons which were never entirely clear 
to me, staying sometimes for just one or two days, sometimes for several weeks" 
(emphasis mine, Sebald 1). It is in resonances such as these, that the reader finds 
him/herself unable to discern when the words of the narrator end and where 
Austerlitz's begin. This uncertainty is furthered in the text's lack of any punctuation 
indicating speech: there are no quotation marks, and only occasionally are the words 
of the narrator and those of Austerlitz separated by a dash. Often the narrator 











Austerlitz" (246). In addition, there are very few paragraph breaks throughout the 
novel, causing the narratives to merge into one another. 
Interestingly, the narrator, through the passing on of his knowledge, combined 
with Austerlitz's narrative, performs what he terms as Austerlitz's "historical 
metaphysic, bringing remembered events back to life" (14). Like Austerlitz, the 
narrator is driven - most probably also in inexplicable ways - to revealing and 
remembering histories which have been lost, or uncovering what has been hidden. 
The epigraph, for example, refers to the narrator's realization that many memories 
and histories need to be remembered: 
... the darkness does not lift but becomes yet heavier as I think how 
little we can hold in mind, how everything is constantly lapsing into 
oblivion with every extinguished life, how the world is, as it were, 
draining itself, in that the history of countless places and objects which 
themselves have no power of memory is never heard, never described 
or passed on. (30-31) 
It is this 'passing on' which the narrator seeks to accomplish, both through 
recounting Austerlitz's narrative and through the fragments of his own musings which 
are scattered throughout the novel. He continues, from this passage, to give an 
example of the history of objects that need to be remembered: 
Histories, for instance, like those of the straw mattresses which lay, 
shadow-like, on the stacked plank beds and which had become thinner 
and shorter because the chaff in them disintegrated over the years, 
shrunken - and now, in writing this, I do remember that such an idea 
occurred to me at the time - as if they were the mortal frames of those 











The correlation here is between Austerlitz's belief, inspired by Evan, that the dead are 
somewhat shrivelled by the experience of death, and the narrator's description of the 
mattresses, which symbolize those who slept on them and perished in the death 
camps, being slightly shorter. Stefanie Harris has commented on the way in which the 
narrator of The Emigrants performs a similar function of remembering histories: "the 
work [The Emigrants] is thus as much a story of the narrator and his attempt to write 
these stories as it is a telling of the stories themselves. That is, the work is an 
interrogation of how these histories are to be represented and told" (380). This 
observation of Harris' applies to the narrator in Austerlitz, whose story is told through 
what he chooses to pass on. 
Reading and Remembering 
In its invocation to its readers to remember, Sebald's Austerlitz presents a text-
scape of fragments that require reading. These fragments, in their fragility - like those 
of the shrunken mattresses in Breendonk fortress - create a sense of temporality that 
arrests the reader's gaze. It is therefore the perception, or reading, of this landscape of 
fragments in the novel that prompts its readers to remember. John Beck, in writing 
about the similar literary style of another of Sebald's texts, The Rings a/Saturn, 
discusses what he terms Sebald's stylistic "textual sediment" (77). The sediment, as 
Beck explains, is created out of traces of what has been forgotten, or the past of the 
landscape: "representational traces ... of realities now 'vanished forever"'(77). In 
The Rings a/Saturn, Sebald focuses on the way in which industry and man's 
intervention in the landscape have destroyed what it once was, leaving only traces -
whereas in Austerlitz, this textual sediment comprises of the traces which point 











which are hidden. As a result of this obvious correlation between the 'textual 
sediment' of Austerlitz and The Rings o.fSaturn, I would like to propose that Beck's 
explanation of the resultant responsibility of the reader when faced with such texts is 
the same for both these works. Beck writes that the text of The Rings of Saturn: 
insists upon reading as the necessary condition for understanding what 
has been lost. While nothing appears to bc safe from violence ... the 
text still persists in its conviction that there is a kind of melancholy 
necessity to the interpretative pattem-making that makes it the most 
serious business of the culture. The reading of textual remains, 
however, is never put forward explicitly as a way of preventing a 
repetition of past calamities. Nevertheless, the failure or refusal to read 
the signs of the past is seen as a denial of responsibility and the wilful 
ignorance of a debased culture. (78) 
There are clear similarities between Austerlitz and The Rings of Saturn, as Beck 
describes it: both texts focus on the responsibility of the reader to engage with the 
history and 'textual remains' that they present. 
The most obvious way in which Sebald creates this 'textual sedimentation' is 
through his intentional blend of genres. Long and Whitehead refer to this as Sebald's 
hybrid genre: 
None of [Sebald's] works [are] easy to categorize in terms of genre; 
each mixes biography, and autobiography, history and fiction, 
travelogue and documentary ... Sebald's works are informed by a 
profound ethical and political seriousness. They evince an almost 











history ... and an enduring concern with what is arguably the defining 
historical event of recent times: the Holocaust. ("Introduction" 4) 
This collection of genres produces a text that is rich in fragments: musings, 
recollections, historical accounts, descriptions of architecture, photographs and 
diagrams. The text brings together a collection of traces that act as signs of the greater 
story which first Austerlitz, and then the narrator, read in them. Following from this, 
the readers of the text encounter these same fragments and are invited to engage with 
them at a textual level. 
The primary way in which the reader is invited to 'read' his or her own 
significance in the text -scape is through the lack of interpretation provided in the text. 
It is because neither Austerlitz, nor the narrator explain - or are able to explain, as 
Swales has argued - the correlations between the fragmentary accounts in the novel, 
that their interpretation is left open to the reader of the text ("Intertext" 85). For 
Swales, Sebald's lack of explanation in his texts is his way of speaking about the 
horrors of the Holocaust without degrading its memory in trite or sensational 
narratives. He explains: 
A number of commentators have suggested that the only true 
commemoration of the horrors let loose on our world by the twentieth-
century history ... above all the Holocaust, is silence, because silence 
acknowledges the gap left by that scale of absence, by so much dying. 
But silence, while it could be eloquent in this way as a conduit of loss, 
is also, by definition, a negation of eloquence. It could also betoken 
indifference ... Sebald's prose ... negotiates this dilemma by using 
words to imply the necessity of silence, to circumscribe silence and 











Sebald's works, therefore, refuse to be silent in their attempt to remember these 
histories. I refer to Swales' profound description: 
What Sebald gives us essentially is ... the circumstantial account of 
places, buildings, personas, all of them marked by the archaeology of 
human suffering ... He avoids confessional overtness because at the 
heart of that overtness would be the scream that would be neither 
aesthetically nor morally endurable. Hence that recurrent lament in 
Sebald's prose that he never quite manages to say what he wants to 
say. He can talk round about it: about the causes and consequences of 
pain, about its signs and traces. But the pain itself, for the most part, is 
implied and not said. ("lntertext" 86) 
It is the way in which Sebald's works navigate their way between revealing and 
revering through their lack of explanation, which is their strength. 
Sebald's text, therefore, performs a double-telling: it narrates Austerlitz's 
story while taking its readers on a similar journey through its textual landscape. Those 
who read Sebald's Austerlitz must necessarily engage with the protagonist's story of 
trauma and align themselves with the role of the narrator as listener. Without a 
listener, or a reader, Austerlitz's story cannot be told. This is because, as Richard 
Kearney has argued, all narrative is inherently dialogic. Kearney writes: "Life is 
always on the way to narrative, but it does not arrive there until someone hears and 
tells this life as a story" (133). Austerlitz' preoccupations with the stories of others-
evidenced in his studies of architectural history - have made him aware of the 
importance of telling his own story. He understands his need for an attentive listener 
to whom he can pass on the fragments of his narrative. "Storytelling," writes 











passing of fragmented moments into a pattern, a plot, a my/has" (4). This narrative 
act, similar to that of perception, transforms fragments and landscapes through 
'humanising' them: through investing them with human presence. Thus, Sebald's text 
passes on the story of Austerlitz to its readers; however, as Austerlitz's story is 
incomplete and fragmented in many ways, those who read it are called both to bear 
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